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SECRECY AND UNACCOUNTABILITY: TRADE SECRETS IN
OUR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
David S. Levine*
Abstract
Trade secrecy-the intellectual property doctrine that allows businesses
to keep commercially valuable information secret for a potentially
unlimited amount of time-is increasingly intruding in the operation of
our public infrastructure, including voting machines, the Internet, and
telecommunications. A growing amount of public infrastructure is being
provided by private entities that are holding critical information about their
goods and services secret from the public. This Article examines this
phenomenon, which is largely unexplored in legal scholarship, and
identifies a significant conflict between the values and policies of trade
secrecy doctrine and the democratic values of accountability and
transparency that have traditionally been present in public infrastructure
projects.
This Article argues that trade secrecy must give way to traditional
notions of transparency and accountability when it comes to the provision
of public infrastructure. Although there are good reasons for trade secrecy
in private commerce, when applied to public infrastructure, the basic
democratic values of transparency and accountability should prevail. The
application of trade secrecy doctrine to public infrastructure projects
causes some unanticipated outcomes, like hiding information that could be
useful for both the public at large and for the improvement of the specific
infrastructure project at issue. This Article examines the background and
history of trade secrecy and contrasts its values with those of democratic
government. It then shows the increasing impact of trade secrecy on public
infrastructure through three examples. Finally, the Article suggests some
potential remedies to this sphere of increasingly conflicting values.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Trade secrecy, by its very name, invokes two core interests: secrecy
and commerce. It is a singularly commercial doctrine designed to protect
commercial interests by allowing companies and individuals to keep
secret, for a potentially unlimited time, those formulas, processes, and

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss1/2

2

Levine: Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrast

TRADE SECRETS IN OUR PUBLICINFRASTRUCTURE

inventions that afford them pecuniary gain.' Standing in stark contrast to
those methods and goals, the ideals, if not the daily practice, of democratic
government minimize commercial interests and generally abhor secrecy
as a default position.2 Transparency and accountability, especially in the
last several decades, are among the core values that drive the
fundamental model of a publicly elected and properly operating
democratic government.
There has always been tension between the interests of the public and
commerce. Indeed, Cato fought the aversion of many of his
contemporaries against the involvement of private persons in the
functioning of government.3 But those observing governmental operations,
in the intervening millennia, would now regard Cato's position as received
wisdom. The public and private sector do not operate without regard for
the operations or interests of the other; rather, they increasingly can and do
regard the other as a direct partner in achieving their vastly different goals.
Increasingly, this intersection of the private person and government is
causing doctrinal conflicts in the rules that have governed these two areas.
Fixed at the intersection of these increasingly intertwined worlds is
trade secret law. Private businesses are increasingly displacing the
government in providing and operating public infrastructure, but these
private businesses are utilizing commercial law standards and norms,
including the key tool of trade secrecy, to do so. Countless examples of
modern infrastructure, from telecommunications in the form of the
Internet, to traditional government operations in the form of voting
machines, are now being provided by the private sector. Because of this
shift to private provision of public infrastructure, the trade secrecy doctrine
has intruded into activities that traditionally have been conducted in the
relatively open realm of public institutions like government. I argue in this
Article that public access to information should prevail over trade secrecy
protection in this sphere.4
1. The seminal definition of trade secrets found in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
states, "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). This
definition has changed and expanded over time. See infra Part III.B.
2. See infra note 96.

3. "'Some have said that it is not the business ofprivate men to meddle with government-a
bold and dishonest saying, which is fit to come from no mouth but that of a tyrant or a slave. To
say that private men have nothing to do with government is to say that private men have nothing

to do with their own happiness or misery; that people ought not to concern themselves whether they
be naked or clothed, fed or starved, deceived or instructed, protected or destroyed."' Cato,
Introductoryquotation to STUART CLOETE, THE THIRD WAY (1947).

4. The application of trade secrecy to the private provision of public infrastructure,
discussed in this Article, remains largely unexplored in law literature. Indeed, trade secrecy itself
is under-explored and under-analyzed in legal scholarship. For discussions ofrelated issues see, for
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Secrecy, and its attendant goals of pecuniary gain and commercial
competition, conflict with the methods and purpose of transparent and
accountable democratic governance. This conflict is crystallized in the
private distribution of voting machines. Voting machines are perhaps the
signature example of a device designed to advance governmental and
democratic interests. Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (Diebold), by its own
estimation, is currently providing over 130,000 voting machines to states.
These machines, replacing older (but not necessarily less reliable) pulllever and punch-card systems, are the public infrastructure through which
elections are conducted, votes are counted, and the results are verified.
They form the backbone upon which one can exercise the right to vote;
they instill confidence that one's vote will not be disregarded, lost, or
erroneously tabulated.
As examined below, however, public access to the internal workings
of these machines is difficult, or in some cases impossible, to obtain. North
Carolina's experience with Diebold illustrates this problem. The North
Carolina State Board of Elections, charged by statute to procure voting
machines for use in its elections, is legally required to have access to the
inner workings of potential vendors' machines. This requirement exists to
guarantee that the Board meets its responsibilities to conduct error-free
and fraud-free elections, and that the vendors supply the information.6 The
disclosure of this information helps to provide legitimacy to, and
trustworthiness in, the very system of conducting elections-a bedrock
requirement of a transparent democratic society.
But in late 2005, potential vendor Diebold, when faced with this law's
requirements, responded differently and focused instead on its commercial
property rights. Rather than comply with the law, it brought a declaratory
judgment action against the state, arguing that it could not supply the
required information. 7 Diebold explained that some of the inner workings
of its voting machines were a third party's intellectual property, likely
trade secrets, to which it did not have access.' Therefore, Diebold claimed
the information could not be shared with the state or the public without
violating intellectual property rights or intellectual property licensing
agreements with third parties, even if it had access to this information.
example, Sharon K. Sandeen, Preservingthe Public Trust in State-Owned Intellectual Property:
A RecommendationforLegislativeAction,32 McGEORGEL. REV. 385,386,387 (2001) (discussing
the ownership of intellectual property by governments); Michael P. Simpson, Note, Future of
Innovation Trade Secrets, PropertyRights, and Protectionism-anAge-Old Tale, 70 BROOK. L.
REv. 1121, 1122 (2005) (discussing the trend towards favoring restrictive trade secret protection
over cooperative innovation and suggesting potential solutions to the posed problem).
Systems,
Diebold Election
About
Systems,
5. Diebold Election
http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
6. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
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Was this a legitimate objection based upon Diebold's trade secret
rights? From a business perspective, it would appear so; but exercising
those rights frustrated the goals of public transparency and accountability.
Rather than comply with the law, Diebold chose to keep its secrets and
withdraw from competition for the state's contract. 9
The Diebold story is one of many. Today, more and more public
infrastructure is provided by the private sector while the use of trade
secrecy by the business world is expanding. Despite the relative dearth of
scholarly analysis of trade secrecy, as compared to copyright and patent
law, it is a vitally important business practice. For example, in one
empirical study of 1,478 manufacturing firms, secrecy ranked first or
second in importance for product innovations in twenty-four of the thirtythree surveyed industries.'
Significantly, secrecy was generally
emphasized over both patents and lead-time in the development of new
processes. " Indeed, one study concluded that between the early 1980s and
the mid-1990s the use of secrecy to protect product innovations had
"increased dramatically."' 2 Even in Silicon Valley, the center of the
technology world, the use of trade secrecy to maintain a "competitive
of secrecy as a core business
edge" has been on the rise.' 3 Thus, the use
4
tool is increasing in use and importance.'
The detrimental effects on access to information grow as private
industry increasingly relies on secrecy to achieve its goals, while, at the
same time, the breadth of application of the trade secrecy doctrine
continues to expand. Should we want or expect private companies like
Diebold to adhere to public values like transparency and accountability in
the provision of public infrastructure, and, if so, can this goal be achieved

9. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
10. Wesley M. Cohen et al., ProtectingTheirIntellectualAssets:AppropriabilityConditions
and Why US. ManufacturingFirmsPatent(OrNot) 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7552, 2000), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf.
11. Id.at 10.
12. Id. at 3.
13. See Hanna Bui-Eve, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies Should
KnowAbout Hiring Competitors'Employees,48 HASTINGSL.J. 981,993 (1997) (noting this trend).
14. See Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A
Normative FrameworkSupporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 71-72 (1999)
(noting the "dramatically increased importance of trade secret law in the world of commerce," and
that "businesses and their legal advisors clearly believe that trade secret law matters"); Josh Lerner,
The Choice of Intellectual Property Protection: Evidence inCivil Litigation 1 (1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file
with author) (analyzing the importance of certain intellectual property
protections for 530 manufacturing firms based inMiddlesex County,Massachusetts,and noting that
"cases involving informal protection-through the mechanism of trade secrecy rather than patents,
trademarks or copyrights-are commonplace, figuring in 43% of the intellectual property
disputes."). To that end, the overuse and improper assertion of trade secrecy protection should be
a concern.
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under the current trade secrecy framework? 5 I argue here that we can and
should expect such public disclosure when companies step out of the
purely private commercial world and seek to reap the financial benefits of
providing essential public infrastructure, and that trade secret law stands
in the way of this goal.
The people and the government, in these contexts, are not simply
buying a product or service where the product legitimately incorporates
trade secrets. Rather, the products or services being procured-and their
attendant trade secrets-are themselves the public infrastructure that
people have traditionally turned to a publicly accountable government to
provide, like the ability to vote, communicate, and access governmental
services. If we do nothing, it will be the infrastructure itself-owned and
operated by private interests with commercial values like business
advantage and secrecy of corporate information-that will direct the law
involving public activity, rather than the law creating the conditions under
which public infrastructure operates.
Trade secrecy law and practices serve many useful and important
purposes in private industry, but, as I argue here, their use in the public
infrastructure context is inappropriate, unexpectedly powerful, and
doctrinally unsound. When private firms provide public infrastructure,
commercial trade secrecy should be discarded (at least in its pure form)
and give way to more transparency and accountability. Industry's broad
definition of "trade secrets," derived from trade secrecy theory, caselaw,
and statutes, is inapplicable to a transparent democratic society.
While the public's interest should prevail, there are certain benefits to
business that may lessen the sting of the loss of trade secrecy protection.
A lack of knowledge about the operations of public infrastructure-and
industry's efforts to keep such knowledge from the public--creates an
atmosphere of concern and lack of trust between industry and the public,
especially in a society infused with fears about national security. By
utilizing a commercial doctrine like trade secrecy while at the same time
requiring that the public use private industry's services for day-to-day
activities, concern, resentment, and distrust exist that might be
significantly lessened were trade secrecy limited.
This Article will examine the problem by first outlining and defining
"public infrastructures" that now rely on private industry for their
maintenance. Part Inl of this Article traces the relevant history and
theoretical underpinnings of trade secrecy law, including secrecy,
commercial use, and fair competition. Part IV contrasts this framework
with two core modern democratic principles, transparency and
accountability. Additionally, Part IV develops the conflict between these
15. Others have made the argument that publicly funded research should not result in trade
secrecy. For a thorough discussion of this issue see Sandeen, supra note 4, at 401.
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competing doctrines and the ramifications of this conflict. Part V analyzes
several recent examples of this problem in the United States, including
Diebold's. I identify the undemocratic results that can occur and the
lessons that can be learned from these events. Part VI considers potential
solutions, including the complete abandonment of trade secrecy in the
public infrastructure context and less drastic measures such as a durational
limit on trade secrecy protection, limitations of remedies for
misappropriating a public infrastructure trade secret, or simple money
damages. I conclude that the best solution is the complete abandonment of
trade secrecy in the private provision of public infrastructure.
II. DEFINING PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND RECENT TRENDS

This Article examines the growing private provision of public
infrastructure. For purposes of this Article, I define public infrastructure
as essential goods and services drawn from the set of public works
traditionally supported or directed by the public sector, including the
operations of the government itself.'6 This definition includes such
categories as telecommunications, governmental operations, and energy. 7
Indeed, this definition is broad enough to include many areas in which
trade secret law interacts with the private provision of public goods and
services.
It is important to note the limited definition employed in this Article.
As Professor Brett Frischmann has noted in his extensive studies of
commons, the word "infrastructure" usually "conjures up the notion of
physical resource systems made by humans for public consumption," like
roads, telephone networks, courts, and schools.' 8 Frischmann defines these
types of infrastructure as "traditional."' 9 My focus is on those traditional
forms of essential infrastructure that have generally been the domain and
responsibility of government to provide, or at least regulate.
The involvement of private industry in the provision of this traditional
public infrastructure, which runs the gamut from roads to waste treatment
facilities, is rapidly increasing in the United States, as well as Europe and
South America.2 ° In most parts of the world, the public sector is now
16. I adopt this definition, with revision, from a definition of infrastructure found in William
F. Fox & Sanela Porca, Investing in Rurallnfrastructure,in BEYONDAGRICULTURE: NEWPOCIE
FOR RURAL AMERICA 63, 63 (Mark Drabenstott ed., 2000), availableat http://www.kc.frb.org/
PUBLICAT/beyond/RC00Fox.pdf. This definition suggests the related question of what public
infrastructure information should be made public versus kept secret. While discussed herein, a full
examination of this question is beyond the scope of this Article. See infra note 154 and
accompanying text.
17. See id.
18. Brett M. Frischmann, InfrastructureCommons, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 121, 123 (2005).
19. Id.
20.

SIDNEY M. LEVY, BUILD, OPERATE, TRANSFER: PAVING THE WAY FOR ToMoRRow's
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viewed as incapable of providing and maintaining infrastructure, and,
combined with the need to keep taxes down, the result is an everincreasing amount ofpublic infrastructure in the hands of private entities.21
Indeed, current privatization proposals include "privatizing services which,
in some countries, have historically been considered to be largely,
sometimes almost exclusively, the domain of the public sector," like waste
disposal and prisons.22
Additionally, the government's share of research and development
dollars in the United States has fallen from 67% in 1960 to 26% in 2000,
indicating this greater reliance on the private sector for the development
and provision of public infrastructure. 23 The result: "Instead of driving
INFRASTRUCTURE 8 (1996). By way of a few recent domestic examples, New York Governor
George E. Pataki is considering selling the Tappan Zee Bridge to private companies in order for
the bridge to be refurbished, rebuilt, or both. Patrick McGeehan, A Bridge That Has Nowhere Left
to Go, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at B 1. Similarly, the state of Indiana has considered the approval
of a lease of the 157-mile Indiana Toll Road, known as the "Main Street of the Midwest," to a
Spanish-Australian consortium that would operate the road for the next seventy-five years. Rick
Callahan, Cash-Strapped States Eye Tollway Leases, BOSTON.COM, Feb. 1, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/02/0 1/cash-strappedstates_states_
eyetollingjleases/?rss_id=Boston.com. The consortium would pay the state to police the road, but
would otherwise be responsible for its maintenance, upkeep, and operation, while at the same time
reaping the profits. Id.Illustrating how governments rely on private-sector technical providers, the
state of Rhode Island's website, http://www.ri.gov, operated by the private company New England
Interactive, reported a security breach in the website whereby over 4,000 credit card numbers were
stolen. Ray Henry, Credit Card Info May Be Vulnerable, RUTLAND HERALD, Jan. 28, 2006,
http://www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID-/20060128/NEWS/601280337. The state
apparently relied on the private provider to fix the problem and report the breach to the relevant law
enforcement and financial institutions. See Security Breach-FAQ, Rhode Island Government,
http://www.ri.gov/security (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). In a telling scenario, for several days
hundreds of automobiles were trapped in a parking garage owned by the City of Hoboken, New
Jersey, when the employees of the company that owned the software that operated the Robotic
Parking "fully automated parking structure[]" were booted by the City during a contractual dispute.
Quinn Norton, Giant Robot Imprisons Parked Cars, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 8, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/1,71554-0.html. The Robotic Parking employees took with
them the "intellectual property rights to the software that made the giant robotic parking structure
work." Id. The City eventually settled, agreeing to pay a $5,500 per month fee to Robotics for a
three-year license to operate the software. Id.
21. A.J. SMITH, PRIVATIZED INFRASTRUCTURE: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 4 (1999). Indeed,
Portland's recent efforts to create a citywide fiber network for Internet access has met with some
concern regarding how it will be financed. Aliza Eamshaw, City's Fiber Plan Could Face
Opposition From Telecoms, PORTLAND Bus. J., Feb. 3, 2006, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/industries/high-tech/internet/2006/02/06/Portland -story5.htm.
Quipped one observer, "I don't think the city has $470 million laying around." Id. As a result, the
financing considerations are limited to creating a public-private partnership, or simply asking a
private company to build and own the network. Id. The provision of citywide Internet access is an
illustrative scenario. See infra Part V.
22. SMITH, supra note 21, at 5.
23. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INDUSTRY AND AGENCY CONCERNS OVER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (2002) (providing the statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr.,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss1/2

8

Levine: Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrast

TRADE SECRETS IN OUR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

research and its outcomes, the government must increasingly rely on the
commercial sector."24 Thus, industry's increasing reliance on trade secrecy
and its increasing involvement and influence in public infrastructure brings
the values of trade secrecy and democratic government in conflict.
Moreover, one critical component of public infrastructure, the Internet,
is operated by the private sector. Today, for example, backbone
functionality-the communication system that allows information to be
transferred from one computer to another-is provided entirely by the
private sector.25 Given that it is in private hands, the rapidly expanding use
of this computer technology in the operations of varying forms of public
infrastructure raises concerns.
Furthermore, the capabilities of infrastructure are increasing because
of the use of information technology, like the Internet. Information
technology has enabled infrastructure to expand both its geographical
scope and its capabilities.26 Its impact is seen from the management of the
flow of traffic on roads to the day-to-day operations of local government.27
Computer networks are fundamental to the operations of such public
infrastructure as transportation, water supply, power, and emergency
services; without functioning computer systems, they would stop
working. 28 Thus, it is difficult to underestimate the reliance that we now
place on technology provided by private entities for the operation ofpublic
infrastructure.29
Additionally, and more broadly, society increasingly uses public
infrastructure. It is omnipresent in all aspects of our lives, from walking
Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management).
24. Id.
25. See Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger & Gernot Brodnig, Information Power: International
Affairs in the Cyber Age 23 (Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Faculty Research Working
Paper Series, 2001), availableat http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/Research/WPaper.nsf/ (follow "By
Author" hyperlink; then follow "Mayer-Schoenberger" hyperlink).
26. Rae Zimmerman & Thomas Horan, What are Digital Infrastructures?, in DIGITAL
INFRASTRUCTURES 3 (Rae Zimmerman ed., 2004).
27. Id.
28. Mark G. Milone, Hacktivism: Securing the NationalInfrastructure,58 Bus. LAW. 383,
383 (2002).
29. Individuals are also impacted when computer networks fail. For an individual user, when
the Internet's "backbone" companies stop providing service or simply have interruptions, the effect
is substantial. See John Borland, Blackout Shows Net's Fragility, CNETNEWS.COM, June 6, 2006,
http://news.com.com/2102-1038_3-5890424.html?tag=st.util.print (reporting on a feud between two
rival backbone Internet companies that resulted in perhaps millions of people being unable to
access portions of the Internet when one company cut off direct communications with the other).
When this happens millions of users can be cut off from vast swaths of the Internet. See id.; Tom
Sanders, Web Outage Hits 120,000 Websites, VNUNET.COM, Nov. 29, 2005,
http://www.vnunet.com/articles/print/2146835 (reporting on a hardware malfunction at domain
name provider Network Solutions that resulted in 120,000 websites being unreachable for over one
hour).
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down the street to being able to contact emergency services if the need
arises. As such, it provides the basic conditions for people to live and for
businesses to exist; its failure is considered one of today's major security
vulnerabilities. ° Professor Mark Lemley has noted that the "market
economy would grind to a halt without the constant support provided by
roads, bridges, airports, and the other infrastructure of modem
government."'" Tellingly, a recent report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies found that "[d]emand for infrastructure services is
outpacing maintenance, renovation, and construction of new facilities in
many infrastructure modes," including mass transit, freight tonnage, and
roadways.32 As private industry provides more and more of this
infrastructure, the urgent need to examine how it does business is obvious.
Trade secrecy is one such tool of business, and its use warrants this
exploration.
In sum, the particular convergence of the increased use of technology
in the operation and provision of public infrastructure, combined with
public infrastructure's increased importance in our daily lives, makes the
issue of the imposition of trade secrecy in public infrastructure all the
more important. The technology industry's involvement in the provision
of public infrastructure, and how the use of trade secrecy impacts the
public, are instructive examples of the values in conflict.33 Reconsidering
how trade secrecy applies in the context of public infrastructure generally,
and explaining specific examples of its application by private technology
30. P.M. Herder & W. A. H. Thissen, Critical Infrastructures:A New and Challenging
Research Field, in CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES:

STATE OF THE ART IN RESEARCH AND

APPLICATION 1 (Wil A. H. Thissen & Paulien M. Herder eds., 2003).
31. Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REv. 521, 533 (2003).
32. EVERETr EHRLICH, PUBLIC WORKS,PUBLIC WEALTH: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR AMERICA'S
INFRASTRUCTURE 3-4 (2005) (noting that infrastructure is a "central part of [the United States']
economic life").
33. Much has been written on the particular reasons and conditions that have led to the rapid
development over the last thirty years of Silicon Valley in California, versus the Route 128 corridor
in Massachusetts. See, e.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE 1-2 (1996) (comparing
and contrasting the two regions). While there are many aspects to this development, one interesting
fact, as noted and explored in Saxenian's excellent book, is that the sharing of information and the
free movement of employees (and their knowledge) from one employer to another helped lead to
Silicon Valley becoming the center of the technology world by the mid- 1990s. Id. at 34-37. Secrecy
was far less utilized in Silicon Valley than in Massachusetts; "collective learning" was a focus in
Silicon Valley in a way that did not exist in Massachusetts. Id.at 2-4, 36-37, 71-73, 149; see also
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal InfrastructureofHigh Technology IndustrialDistricts:Silicon Valley,
Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 620 (1999) (explaining that
California voids "employer-imposed restraints on employee mobility," thereby encouraging
"knowledge spillovers," whereas Massachusetts enforces such restraints, thereby blocking such
spillovers); Tait Graves & Alexander Macgillivray, Combination Trade Secrets and the Logic of
IntellectualProperty,20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 261,274 (2004) (noting that
"scholars have found that states with a less overbearing trade secrets regime are more likely to
provide for growth in high-technology industry").
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companies, can serve as a useful model to reconsider trade secret
applicability in this critical aspect of public life.
1I. THE POLICIES AND VALUES OF TRADE SECRET LAW
At its core, trade secret law envisions a fundamental scenario:
competition between private actors whose primary objective is pecuniary
gain.34 As previously noted, the most often-cited definition of trade secrets,
found in the Restatement (First) of Torts, states: "A trade secret may
consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."35 Thus,
it is fair to summarize the general qualifications for having a trade secret
as information that: (1) confers some sort of competitive advantage, (2)
when secrecy is maintained, and (3) is not in the public domain or
otherwise publicly known.36 Each element will be explored below, as their
contours are not as obvious as may appear.
As broad as this definition is-including within its grasp all manner of
business information and cited often to this day as the basic definition of
a trade secret-it has been expanded even further over the ensuing decades
to encompass more and more commercial, and even non-commercial,
activity under its umbrella.37 But the effects of this steady expansion of the
definition of what constitutes a trade secret can only be comprehended
when considered in tandem with the remedial power inherent in having a
trade secret: the ability to keep that information private and protect it from
any public dissemination, possibly forever. Should the trade secret leak out
by misappropriation (i.e., theft, breach of confidence, and the like), the
fundamental remedy for misappropriating a trade secret is an injunction
against the misappropriator using the information for the life of the trade
secret.3" Such an injunction serves as a means to return what may have
been briefly in the public's hands, or at least susceptible to public
dissemination, back into private, and consequently secret, hands.39 In
34. "The typical defendant in a trade secret case is a competitor who has misappropriated the
plaintiff's business secret for profit in a business venture." DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner,
10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). It might be more accurately stated that such a
typical defendant is one who has allegedly misappropriated a trade secret.
35. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
36. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search ofJustification,
86 CAL. L. REv. 241, 248 (1998).
37. As discussed in more detail below, the definition of what constitutes a trade secret has
expanded over time, as has the actual definition of a "secret" itself and possible relief when a trade
secret is misappropriated. See infra Part III.B. Moreover, in many jurisdictions, governments and
non-profit organizations can hold trade secrets. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
38. See JAMES PooLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 7.02[2][a] (2005).
39. Interestingly and paradoxically, in at least one state, misappropriating a trade secret and
disseminating it on the Internet is not sufficient to render the trade secret in the "public domain"
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theory, if not always in practice, the trade secret injunction is the edifice
that blocks the broader public from benefitting from the public (albeit
unlawful) dissemination of the information.
Finally, it is worth noting one element of trade secrecy that benefits the
public: Reverse engineering40 and independent discovery are allowed.
Such discovery is entirely lawful, and would allow the discoverer to use
the trade secret in commerce.4 Thus, if a user independently reveals the
composition of a trade secret through his own efforts, that person is free
to reap the rewards of the effort. However, because affirmative activity by
those interested in learning the trade secret is required, a significant burden
falls on the seeker of information to do the required work of discovery.
In order to understand how these elements of trade secrecy doctrine
pose major problems when applied to public infrastructure, it is essential
to first understand the theoretical construct of trade secret law and its
development. By considering the values that drive trade secrecy, and its
expansion in recent decades, the fundamental divergence with our
traditional notions of accountable and open government become evident.
Especially because the law's doctrinal development has been driven
primarily by common law, the law's core underpinnings take a bit of a
circuitous route through various jurisdictions, from courts to restatements,
and only recently through legislatures.42 Thus, a complete exploration
such that it is no longer considered a trade secret. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
2006).
40. Reverse engineering

§ 600A.055 (West

is the process of discovering the technological principles of a mechanical
application through analysis of its structure, function and operation. It often
involves taking something (e.g., a mechanical device, an electronic component,
a software program) apart and analyzing its workings in detail, usually with the
intention to construct a new device or program that does the same thing without
actually copying anything from the original."
Wikipedia.org, Definition of Reverse Engineering, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Reverse engineering (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). Reverse engineering a trade secret is generally
permissible. See CAL. CIr. CODE

§

3426. 1(a) (West 2006) ("Reverse engineering or independent

derivation alone shall not be considered improper means.").
41. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,476 (1974) (noting that "discovery
by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-called

reverse engineering" is lawful and not precluded by trade secrecy law).
42. Indeed, one of the major differences between trade secrecy law and the other three major
areas of intellectual property (trademarks, copyrights, and patents) is that those three areas have
significant statutory support and history. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1072 (West 2006) (codifying
trademark law); 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-122 (West 2006) (codifying copyright law); 35 U.S.C.A.
§§ 100-105 (West 2006) (codifying patent law). Trade secrecy, on the other hand, has only recently
been the subject of federal legislative consideration. See Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (West
2006)). Thus, in order to explore the underpinnings of trade secrecy, it is especially important to
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requires consideration of these various sources of law.
A. The TheoreticalFrameworkof Trade Secrecy: Commerce
From its inception as a doctrine, the basic theory of trade secrecy has
maintained a singular focus on commercial activity. Among the many
variables defining what constitutes a trade secret, commercial concerns
have been the one bedrock constant throughout the law's development.
The primary concerns of trade secret law are maintaining business ethics
and the encouragement of the inventive spirit and innovation in businesses.
Businesses rely upon trade secrecy to maintain competitive advantages,
spur product development and innovation, and ultimately attempt to
maximize capture of the economic benefits of their work. 3
As discussed below, whether considered a function of property, tort,
unfair competition, or contract, both commentators and courts historically
have considered how trade secrecy law should be applied, and what results
should be reached, by focusing on these commercial values and ideas. '
Indeed, even when courts and legislatures have allowed trade secrets to be
held by the government,45 legislatures and courts have still relied upon
commercial bases and rationales when defining their application and
effect.4 6
review early case law and those opinions that became the classic statements of trade secrecy's
definition, application, and purview.
43. See POOLEY, supranote 38, § 1.0212]. The Supreme Court of Illinois adds a third policy
consideration in favor of trade secrecy, also commercial in nature: the "public interest in having
free competition in the sale and manufacture of goods not protected by a valid patent." Brunswick
Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (I11.1980). At a general level of fair
competition between commercial entities, there is nothing wrong with maintaining a secret for these
reasons. If, on the other hand, secrecy is maintained in order to hide product deficiencies, limit
public criticism, or deceive the public, then trade secrecy's underpinnings are mutated, and the
justification for trade secrecy is undermined.
44. Whether trade secrets should be viewed as a right relating to property, tort, unfair
competition, contract, or a combination thereof, and what this means for the development of the
law, has been thoroughly analyzed, see, e.g., Bone, supra note 36, at 245, but is not the focus of
this Article. Moreover, it is not particularly relevant here, as the "dispute over the nature of trade
secret rights has had little practical effect on the rules governing civil liability for the appropriation
of a trade secret." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995).
45. This is a dangerous and, I believe, erroneous endeavor that will be discussed in some
detail in Part IV.
46. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.61(C) (West 2006) (defining a person covered
by Ohio's Uniform Trade Secrets Act as including government entities); Richard A. Epstein,
Privacy,Publication,andthe FirstAmendment: The DangersofFirstAmendment Exceptionalism,
52 STAN. L. REv. 1003, 1044 (2000) (arguing that the "government has the same right as private
parties to classify information. If the material that it wishes to keep secret qualifies under the
general trade secret laws, then like any private party it has the right to injunctive relief to prevent
that information from slipping into hostile hands"). As I argue here, and explain more fully below,
because the basic theoretical underpinnings of trade secrecy focus exclusively on commercial
concerns, trade secrecy (as currently conceived) and government should not mix. The government
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This theoretical conception of the world of trade secrets-as purely
private matters between businesses or individuals-flows through the
earliest caselaw and various restatements of the law, and drives the
decisions of courts and legislators. Trade secret law, from its inception as
a legal doctrine, envisaged commercial actors in competition for market
share. Despite its recent application to the scenarios discussed here, the
core elements defining a trade secret-maintained secrecy and connection
to commercial activity-have not significantly changed in centuries.47
In one of the earliest United States court cases addressing trade secrets,
a Massachusetts state court decision from 1837, a secret process for
making chocolate was the trade secret at issue.48 The plaintiff, a potential
purchaser of a chocolate business, brought an action alleging that the terms
of the sale included that the defendant-seller convey his secret formula to
the plaintiff.49 The defendant refused to convey it and argued that he had
the right to retain the secret and share it with others.5" In finding that the
secret should have been conveyed with the business and holding that the
requirement of conveying the secret was not a "restraint of trade," the
Court summarized the purely private nature of the information and rights
at issue:
The defendant claims to operate by a secret art. The public
are not prejudiced by the transfer of it to the plaintiff. If it
were worth any thing, the defendant would use the art and
keep it secret, and it is of no consequence to the public
whether the secret art be used by the plaintiff or by the
defendant.5"
This case exhibits the fundamental elements of trade secrecy: the (1)
"secret art," here, a business method of making chocolate, (2) focus on the
secret's "value" to the business, and (3) the public's lack of general
interest in which private party owns the secret.
In later opinions, courts continued to wrestle with whether allowing a
secret business method was akin to a restraint of trade, but consistently
has more appropriate and doctrinally consistent avenues by which to "classify" information, like
the various Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions that currently exist. See infra Part VI.
47. There is limited scholarship on the history of trade secrecy prior to the creation of the
United States. See, e.g., A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi
Corrupti, 30 CoLuM. L. REv. 837, 837-38 (1930) (discussing Roman application of trade secret
principles). But see Alan Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Myth Exploded, 11 TUL.
EuRo. Civ. L. R. 19 (1996) (challenging Schiller's conclusions). I focus here on trade secrecy's
development in the United States, primarily because I seek to draw contrasts with certain governing
values of American democracy.
48. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (1 Pick.) 523, 525 (1837).
49. Id. at 526.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
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held that it was not because, among other reasons, the general public's
interest in businesses' secrets was minimal. 2 In 1939, the American Law
Institute published its seminal Restatement (First) of Torts.5 3 This
contained the first comprehensive effort in the United States to
systematically define a trade secret and outline its parameters. 4 The
authors posited that it was the maintenance of business competition ethics
and proper means of acquiring knowledge, and not a property or similar
right, that warranted liability for the misappropriation of a trade secret.55
As they stated, "The theory that has prevailed is that the protection is
afforded only by a general duty of good faith and that the liability rests
upon breach of this duty; that is, breach of contract, abuse of confidence,
or impropriety in the method of ascertaining the secret."56 Again, purely
private commercial interests were the focus.
Certainly after the Restatement (First)of Torts, if not sooner, there could
be no doubt that trade secrecy was an exclusively commercial doctrine.
Modem model codes and restatements echo this paradigm. The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, promulgated in 1979 and revised in 1985, cites Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. and notes that commercial ethics remain the focus
of trade secret law. 7 Similarly, the contemporary Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition, which inherited the doctrine of trade secrecy from the
Restatement (First)of Torts,58 notes several "interests" advanced by trade
secrecy, all of which involve primarily commercial concerns: (1) "the
unfairness inherent in obtaining a competitive advantage through a breach
of confidence"; (2) encouraging investment by allowing trade secret holders
to recapture the financial rewards of their innovations; (3) the "efficient
exploitation of knowledge" by allowing for disclosure of information to
"employees, agents, licensees, and others who can assist in its productive
use"; and (4) "personal privacy."59 Secrecy, backed by general
standards of commercial ethics and norms, remained the constant.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recently reinforced this
52. See 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72 N.W. 140, 144 (Mich. 1897) (hinging its
willingness to maintain the secret of the business on the judgments that (a) secrecy was an
acceptable business decision, (b) public interest allowed for the maintenance of an agreement to
maintain a business secret, and (c) the public's right to the information was non-existent); Dr. Miles
Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 402 (1911) (finding that a medicine
manufacturer may rely "upon the ownership of its secret process and its rights are to be determined
accordingly").
53. See supra note I and accompanying text.
54. POOLEY, supra note 36, § 2.02[1].
55. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
56. Id.
57. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985); see also supra note 41.
58. This change apparently took place as the development of the law moved away from tort
based theories to those of unfair competition. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 1-2 (1979).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995).
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conception, equating trade secrets with "domestic gossip or other
information of purely private concer. '6°
As can be seen, from the earliest cases discussing the "secret art" of
chocolate producers to the Supreme Court's modern day view of trade
secrets as a "purely private" concern, courts, commentators, and authors
of model codes and restatements have developed trade secrecy's
parameters by conceptualizing the commercial actor in the business world
competing with his rivals for commercially valuable information. That is
a world where the public at large has no strong interest. 61 This, of course,
makes intuitive sense when the goal is to maintain a level and fair playing
field for all those who seek to operate or work for a profit-seeking
business.
B. Trade Secrecy Doctrineand Its IncongruousElements
The ever-expanding definition of a trade secret through a broadening
of what constitutes "secrecy" and "commercial use," and how these
doctrines have been applied (and misapplied) to more and more situations,
amplifies the impact of trade secrecy in commerce. Additionally, the fact
that a trade secret can be held forever makes the ability to hinder
disclosure and public dissemination of information even more powerful.
Inasmuch as trade secrecy is playing a major role in business operations
and strategy, and businesses are increasingly entering the market for public
infrastructure, the growing breadth of trade secrecy is a harbinger of
increasing conflict as the worlds of private and public life mesh. To
understand the magnitude of this expansion, the broad ambit of trade
secrecy and its expansive application will be discussed briefly below.
1. What Is "Secrecy," and What Is Its Impact on the Public?
While secrecy is at the core of the trade secrecy doctrine,62 the
60. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001). Bartnicki has been the subject of much
criticism because of its restrictive definition of a "public concern" that would justify speech
notwithstanding the commercial interests and rights of trade secret holders. See Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and
Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697, 739-49 (2003) (commenting that the courts have a myopic view
of what constitutes a "public concern," and, in any case, should not be the entity deciding what is
a "public concern" for purposes of First Amendment analysis).
61. Based upon the above, now it should be no surprise that the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals would state, "Although the bulk of trade secret law relates to industrial information, some
kinds of non-industrial business information-for example, data related to customers,
merchandising, cost and pricing, and systems and methods-are also protected." Lehman v. Dow
Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 298 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE
SECRETS § 2.09[8] (1985)).
62. Id.
at 298 (stating that "the most important consideration remains whether the information
was secret").
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Restatement (First)of Torts noted that the protection of trade secrets is
"not based on a policy of rewarding or otherwise encouraging the
development of secret processes or devices. The protection is merely
against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's
secret., 63 Yet, the explanation in the Restatement begs the question: Isn't
the encouragement of creating "secret processes or devices" precisely the
byproduct and result of a law that values secrecy as its "most important
consideration" in order for its protection to be operational? It would seem
so, if the previously discussed empirical data derived from industry is to
be believed.'
This answer is further underscored because "secrecy" results in lost
opportunities to easily gain information and knowledge, a critical problem
when the information involves the public infrastructure that all use. 65 The
commercial benefits of secrecy accrue with no requirement of easy access
to the information. This can be illustrated by briefly comparing patent and
trade secrecy law. The basic patent trade-off-public disclosure of all
elements of the patented work, be it a product, business method, or
invention, in return for a limited-time monopoly granted to the patent
owner-achieves the dual goals of public dissemination (transparency) and
the ability to examine and confirm (if not necessarily profit from such
knowledge, i.e., accountability) that are largely absent in trade secrecy.
While one may not reproduce the patented work for profit, one may at
least access the information relatively easily and attempt to build upon or
critique it. But under trade secrecy law there is no opportunity for the
general public to easily examine information deemed secret. As the
Supreme Court noted in 1933, although monopoly rights are not granted
with trade secrecy, there is no need for the trade secret holder to ever
disclose the secret to the public.'
This difference has been discussed with reference to patents. One early
commentator distinguished between using patentable information in public
versus the use of information by the public, explaining:
A use in public is not necessarily a use by the public. It is
distinguished, not from an individual, but from a secret use.
63. RESTATEMENT (FIRST)OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
64. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. Of course, trade secret law keeps nothing
secret per se; rather, it encourages and enables the protection of secrets and protects information
that has lost its secrecy.
65. Easy access would be, for example, a simple request for the information or its general
public availability by way of the Interet or another media device. No significant effort would be
required, as compared to the potentially time-intensive work of reverse engineering, allowed under
trade secrecy doctrine. Moreover, the fact that a trade secret that is reverse engineered may
theoretically be used by those who make the effort does not change the fact that effort is required
to access the information. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
66. U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 185-86 (1933).
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It is a use which places the invention in such a relation to the
that ifthey choose to be acquaintedwith it, they can do
public
67
SO.

Patent law allows the real possibility, and perhaps likelihood, of a use in
public that offers easy opportunities for knowledge gained by the public.
Trade secrecy, however, as applied to public infrastructure, is a use in
public with little easy opportunity for knowledge gained by the public. It
offers no such simple opportunity; its impact here is to deny the public the
ability to "choose to be acquainted" with the relevant knowledge-to keep
information secret.
Moreover, trade secrecy exacerbates the loss of public information
because it encourages the strictest efforts to hide information from public
view. The ease with which one may ascertain information generally
determines whether the information may be deemed a secret. Thus, the
right to trade secrecy protection is "defined by the extent to which the
'
owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others."68
Indeed, the Restatement (First)of Torts listed six bases for determining
whether information constitutes a trade secret, reflecting a clear focus on
the owner's activities and a heavy burden placed on the owner of the secret
to maintain secrecy:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of
[the] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in [the] business; (3) the
extent of measures taken by [the business] to guard the
secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to
[the business] and [its] competitors; (5) the amount of effort
or money expended by [the business] in developing the
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by
others.... 69

This places the onus squarely on the secret holder to prove that he has
made efforts to keep the secret. In fact, only the sixth factor (the ability to
reverse engineer) does not depend, at least in some part, on the efforts
made to keep the secret.
But trade secrecy doctrine has taken an unusual course, and in doing so
67. Louis Burgess & Ralph Dinklage, Secret Use in its Relation to the "Public Use"
ProvisionsofR.S. 4886,28 J. PAT. & TRADEMARKOFF. SOc'Y 815,818 (1946) (quoting 1 WILLIAM
C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 434 (1890)).

68. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 13 (Cal. 2003) (quoting Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984)).
69. Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (N.Y. 1993) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)) (alteration in original).
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has created alternate methods by which to establish a trade secret. The
importance of that sixth factor is greater than one might expect, and its
importance relative to other considerations increases the possibility of
protecting information as a trade secret. Although this list of factors is still
cited today,7 ° its contours are often altered such that proving a secret can
be achieved with less reference to the actual activities of the owner, or put
another way, with less reference to the first five factors.7 ' Referring to
Kewanee's definition" as an "early basic tenet of trade secrets law," one
court recently explained, "Modem court3, however, have taken a different
approach: 'Secrecy' may be measured by 'the ease with which information
can be developed through proper means: if the information can be readily
duplicated without involving considerable time, effort or expense, then it
is not secret."' 73 Surprisingly, the converse has also been found:
"[I]nformation may be classified as a trade secret, regardless of its
presence in the public domain or the ability of a competitor to acquire the
information, based on the difficulty in discovering the trade secret, for
example, through reverse-engineering." 74 The modem Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition appears to support this alternate basis for
establishing a trade secret." Thus, the sixth factor seems to be more

70. See Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1245 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that
Oklahoma utilizes these six factors).
71. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 918 (Ind. 1993) ("'Although all of the
Restatement's factors no longer are required to find a trade secret, those factors still provide helpful
guidance to determine whether the information in a given case constitutes 'trade secrets' within the
definition of the statute."' (quoting Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578,585 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991))); In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. 2003) ("We agree with the Restatement
[(Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. d] and the majority ofjurisdictions that the party claiming
a trade secret should not be required to satisfy all six factors because trade secrets do not fit neatly
into each factor every time.").
72. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
73. Crane Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 313, 323-24 (2003) (quoting
C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
74. Id. at 324.
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f(1995) ("[Tihe requirement
of secrecy is satisfied if it would be difficult or costly for others who could exploit the information
to acquire it without resort to . . . wrongful conduct .... "). Of course, this might include
considerations of how much a trade secret owner has actually attempted to guard the secret, but the
spotlight on the inherent difficulty of reverse engineering moves the focus away from the owner's
activities and more towards those of the alleged misappropriator. Alternatively, a trend towards
devaluing reverse engineering as a defense to misappropriation, viewing it as a cover to obscure
actual misappropriation, or both, is possible. Under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (West 2006)), which
criminalizes some forms of trade secret theft, at least one commentator has noted that the status of
reverse engineering as a defense to misappropriation is "ambiguous." See Craig L. Uhrich, The
Economic Espionage Act-Reverse Engineering and the Intellectual PropertyPublic Policy, 7
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 147, 174 (2000-0 1).
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important than the first five.76 The result is that courts are increasingly
tasked with the highly subjective job of
determining what constitutes
77
"difficult or costly" reverse engineering.
In sum, the definition of a "secret" takes on unusual connotations under
trade secrecy doctrine. One may develop a process that is extremely timeintensive and costly to reproduce, and do comparatively little to maintain
its secrecy, and still call it a "secret." This is proper in the commercial
world, as it rewards the time and effort expended in creating a valuable (or
potentially valuable) service or process. However, as discussed in Part IV,
to the public these many ways to secrecy create additional impediments to
understanding the infrastructure upon which they rely. As explained by
one California appellate court, the basic prohibition remains the same: "A
trade secret is private property and belongs in the public domain if, and
only if, the inventor sees fit to divulge it."'78 The effect of these unusual
definitions is clear: More, and not less, information has the possibility of
being protected by trade secrecy doctrine from unfettered public disclosure
and examination.79
2. What is "Commercial Use"?
The definition of "commercial use" in trade secrecy doctrine has
expanded greatly over the last seventy-five years, and its varying
definitions have caused more information to fall under the protection of
trade secrecy doctrine. The impact of this expansion is to create greater
impediments to unfettered access to information. This extension can be
seen by briefly tracing its contours in the Restatements and significant
model codes and federal laws of the twentieth century.
From the days of the Restatement (First)of Torts,80 the ensuing decades
have seen an erosion of the requirement that the information actually be
"continuous[ly] use[d] in the operation of a business." The Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA), promulgated in 1979 and revised in 1985, affected
a sea change in the contours of trade secrecy by requiring that the
76. See Laird,supranote 71, at 918 ("In determining whether information is protectable as
a trade secret, '[t]he first and foremost consideration is whether the ... information is readily
accessible to a reasonably diligent competitor."' (quoting Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648
F. Supp. 661, 682 (D. Minn. 1986))).
77. See Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1001 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (stating
that "[w]hether information is 'readily ascertainable by proper means' is a matter of degree....").
78. Sinclair v. Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr., 654, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
79. See Chiappetta, supranote 14, at 89 (noting that, in comparison to patents, "trade secret
protection extends to an extremely wide variety of information"); Don Weisner & Anita Cava,
Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REv. 1076, 1125 (1988) (commenting that the "legal
definition of a trade secret is very undiscriminating and allows nearly all business ideas to
qualify").
80. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) ("A trade secret is a process or
device for continuous use in the operation of the business.").
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"information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process" derive "independent economic value,
actual or potential."'" The comments to this section explained, "The
broader definition in the proposed Act extends protection to a plaintiffwho
has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret
to use."82
Thus, by 1985, the definition of a trade secret could include
information that had not even been established in the business as
commercially useful, as well as "business information. 8 3 In fact, utilizing
similar definitions, courts have rejected arguments that information cannot4
be a trade secret where its value is merely a "hypothetical possibility."
Moreover, the definition includes negative data or information, such as
"the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain
process will not work." 5 In sum, the UTSA solidified the fact that an
abundance of information, far beyond the purely "commercial," would be
protected by trade secrecy. In the present context, this means that more
public infrastructure information may be withheld from public inspection
under trade secrecy law.
Evidencing how much lower the economic threshold for trade secrecy
protection has fallen, 1995's Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
explicitly states that the economic advantage afforded the trade secret
owner "need not be great," and it would be "sufficient if the secret
provides an advantage that is more than trivial. 86 Thus, virtually all
information that may, in some more than trivial way, have any value to a
company could qualify as a trade secret. The federal Economic Espionage
Act (EEA) of 1996, which criminalizes most forms of misappropriation,
is perhaps the ultimate culmination of the elimination of the "continuous
use" requirement in trade secrecy law. It builds upon the UTSA definition,
and includes virtually
all business information, including business plans
87
and customer lists.
By 2005, a form of the UTSA had been adopted in forty-four states and
81. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985) (emphasis added).
82. Id. § 1 cmt.
83. See Carbo Ceramics, Inc. v. Keefe, 166 Fed. App'x 714,720 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that
"there was abundant evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that [plaintiff] had a trade secret
in its business plans and strategies, including pricing for its products as well as detailed information
regarding industry trends, customers, and customer preferences").
84. See Joint Stock Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 390, 409 (D. Del. 2000)
(involving the question of whether sealed recipes to make "flavored vodkas and liqueurs" should
be unsealed, and upholding the special master's application of trade secrecy protection to the
plaintiff's vodka recipes under the Delaware Trade Secrets Act, in part because while "these vodka
recipes may be old, they are nevertheless a source of potential value to the defendants").
85. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (1995).
87. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (West 2006); POOLEY, supranote 38, § 13.03[2].
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the District of Columbia.88 The Restatement's "continuous use"
requirement is largely dead.89 Untethering the "commercial use" factor
from actual "economic value" has substantially expanded the potential
application of the trade secrecy doctrine to virtually any form of
information connected to a business.9" The public suffers from an
increasing inability to access information, which in the context of, for
example, whether a voting machine is properly tabulating votes, is
troublesome. Regardless of this concern, the current trend is towards more,
rather than less, business information being subject to trade secret
protection. The myriad complications that this creates are discussed in
Part V.
3. The Infinite Possible Duration of a Trade Secret
Aside from the broad definition of "secret" and the limited need for
information to have commercial currency, one consistent element in trade
secrecy doctrine is the theoretical unlimited duration of a trade secret. So
long as the elements of trade secrecy are met, the right to keep a secret for
an infinite period of time underscores the real power of enjoying trade
secret protection. For instance, the "secret combination of flavoring oils
and ingredients known as 'Merchandise 7X,"' the formula for Coca-Cola,
which is not patented, is the most famous example of a trade secret and has
existed as a trade secret for over 100 years.91 Why would Coca-Cola
choose trade secrecy over patents? Precisely because of the infinite
duration of trade secret protection; Coca-Cola bet on its ability to maintain
the secret, and by doing so afforded itself protection (and the concomitant
pecuniary gain attendant to a monopoly) far beyond the twenty-year limit
of patent protection.92
88. POOLEY, supra note 38, § 2.03[7][a]. It should be noted that the states have made
alterations to the UTSA on a state-by-state basis, but, as one commentator has noted, the
similarities in substance between the states are greater than differences in the language used. Id.
§ 2.03[7][c].
89. See Bone, supranote 36, at 249-50 (noting that the continuous use requirement has been
"relaxed or ignored" in recent years).
90. See id. at 248 (noting that "almost anything can qualify as a trade secret, provided it has
the potential to generate commercial value"). However, it is possible that even this statement is too
narrow, as commercial value is now required at something just above trivial.
91. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289
(D. Del. 1985). Noting the efforts that Coca-Cola has undertaken to protect its secret, the court
explained that the formula "has been tightly guarded since Coca-Cola was first invented and is
known by only two persons within The Coca-Cola Company" and that the "only written record of
the secret formula is kept in a security vault at the Trust Company Bank in Atlanta, Georgia, which
can only be opened upon a resolution from the Company's Board of Directors." Id.
92. Daniel N. Christus et al., Intellectual Propertyin the Americas, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1095, 1099 (1998) ("The decision of whether or not to patent the Coca-Cola formula came down
to a question of whether they wanted to have a seventeen year monopoly or whether they wanted
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State statutes also prescribe that a "trade secret endures and is
protectable and enforceable until it is disclosed or discovered by proper
means." 93 Because a trade secret lasts, at least in theory, as long as a trade
secret holder maintains its secrecy, the possibility that the information will
never enter the public domain is very real. Whatever benefits the public
might gain from unfettered access to the information is lost, so long as
secrecy is maintained, the possibility of independent discovery of the trade
secret is low, and active efforts like reverse engineering are unsuccessful.
Thus, the choice of trade secrecy offers the benefit of a monopoly on the
information for a potentially infinite period of time.
In sum, trade secrecy, as currently configured, is a pervasive and
powerful tool for business. Its contours and scope of protection are
expanding along with its power as a device to maintain privacy and
secrecy. Although one may quibble at the margins regarding the likelihood
of independent discovery of a trade secret, whether a trade secret may
really be kept forever, or whether trade secrecy is chosen over patent in
every sector important to public infrastructure, there is little dispute that
trade secrecy remains a dominant intellectual property strategy for many
businesses. We now turn to examine how the values that animate trade
secret law align with those animating the provision of public
infrastructure.
IV. THE VALUES AND PRIORITIES OF OPEN GOVERNMENT

The conflict between trade secrecy and a transparent and accountable
democratic government is ultimately a clash of governing theory and
values. Trade secrets, by their very name, have secrecy as the default
position; while loss of protection and consequential transparency can and
does happen, recognition of the value of secrecy remains its governing
principle.94 In contrast, democratic government operates by diametrically
opposed values, which I define for these purposes and explain below as
transparency and accountability. While there are exceptions, especially
after the passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), democratic
government is driven by notions of transparency and accountability.95
Secrecy is the exception, rather than the norm. When considering these
contrasting goals and values, it becomes apparent that trade secrecy and
to rely on the [sic] their ability to keep this a trade secret forever.") (comments by Robert Wagner).
Again, unlike trade secrecy, a patent affords the public the ability to examine the information, and
after the twenty-year term of the patent, to use that information in commerce. Thus, the public can
design around the information to create new processes that can expand our knowledge base.
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30 (2005).
94. As explained by the Supreme Court, trade secret material "must be secret, and must not
be of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business." Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974).
95. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2006).
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public accountability cannot easily coexist.
A. The Public Values of TransparencyandAccountability
In order to grasp the fundamental conflict between trade secrecy
applied by private providers of public infrastructure and the democratic
values of transparency and accountability, it is important to briefly
96
examine how these two values orient government as we know it today.
The prominence of the values of transparency and accountability in our
assumptions about how government should work makes the overlay of
trade secrecy problematic. The contours of their practical application in
society highlight the disconnect between accountability and trade secrecy,
but also suggest some of the remedies to the problem.
In the mid-nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham eloquently developed
the values and benefits inherent in a government that is open to public
inspection. While noting that maintaining secrets may have some shortterm benefits, Bentham succinctly stated that in "an assembly elected by
the people, and renewed from time to time, publicity is absolutely
necessary to enable the electors to act from knowledge."97 He explained:
To conceal from the public the conduct of its representatives,
is to add inconsistency to prevarication: it is to tell the
constituents, "You are to elect or reject such or such of your
deputies without knowing why-you are forbidden the use of
reason-you are to be guided in the exercise of your greatest
96. It is important to note that I am not suggesting that government always, or even often,
operates in this manner, but that it should and that these values are imbued into our government.
Nor is this Article intended as a survey of democratic values and institutions generally. Clearly,
government often operates in the shadows and against the values of transparency and
accountability. See generally PHILIP H. MELANSON, SECRECY WARS: NATIONAL SECURITY,
PRIVACY, AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW (2001) (analyzing and detailing various efforts of the

United States government to keep information secret, even where there is no basis to do so). While
events like the recent scandal involving lobbyist Jack Abramoff and his illegal campaign
contributions to various members of Congress underscore the fact that our government often does
business in relative secrecy, it is telling that Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist's reaction to the
revelation of the scandal was to state that he intends to "examine and act on any necessary changes
to improve transparency and accountability for our body when it comes to lobbying." See Elana
Schor, Lieberman Signs on to McCain Lobbying Reform Bill, THE HILL, Sept. 26, 2006, available
at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontage/0 10406/web.html. Faced with
this scandal, Frist cited "transparency and accountability" as the answer. Id. For purposes of this
Article, whether this will actually happen is less important than the fact that he cited those values
as the proper governmental solution to the scandal of illegal lobbying contributions that allegedly
took the form of bribes. See id.
97. JEREMY BENTHAM, An Essay on PoliticalTactics (1791), reprintedin 2 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM, 299, 310-12 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1837); see also
SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 171, 174-75 (1982)
(discussing Bentham's contributions to this area).
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powers only by hazard or caprice. ,,98
Significantly, Bentham did not merely suggest openness as a rallying cry
for the sake of the public, but openness as a benefit to the government as
well. Although somewhat antiquated and perhaps na've, his was a call to
arms that government should maintain as open a policy as possible:
But in an open and free policy, what confidence and
security-I do not say for the people, but for the governors
themselves! Let it be impossible that any thing should be
done which is unknown to the nation-prove to it that you
neither intend to deceive nor to surprise-you take away all
the weapons of discontent. The public will repay with usury
the confidence you repose in it. Calumny will lose its force;
it collects its venom in the caverns of obscurity, but it is
destroyed by the light of day.99
Not merely advocating a utilitarian reason for openness, Bentham argued
that government operates both more efficiently and, more importantly,
legitimately when the rights of the people to know what their government
is doing-the "open and free policy"--are respected. Thus, the core
benefit became accountability to the electing public through transparency:
"The best project prepared in darkness, would excite00more alarm than the
worst, undertaken under the auspices of publicity."'
Perhaps the best modem-day statement of these core values is found in
the passage of FOIA."'0 FOIA, enacted in 1966 as a result of increased
interest in allowing investigative journalism," 2 is designed to force
disclosure and "permit access to official information long shielded
unnecessarily from public view ' '1°3 by permitting any citizen (and indeed,
businesses) to request information from the government by way of a FOIA
request. " As explained in the introduction to one of the core studies of the
rights of citizens to government information, "Few aspects ofgovernmentcitizen relations are more central to the responsible operation of a
representative democracy than the citizen's ability to monitor
98. See BENTHAM, supra note 97, at 312.
99. Id. at310-11.
100. Id.at 310.
101. Of course, the need for FOIA in the first place suggests that there are barriers to
transparency in government. Were it the general practice of government to share information that
is not subject to serious misuse, then perhaps FOIA would be unnecessary. Transparency needed
to be forced, but the fact that it was speaks volumes about the priority placed on this value.
102. Christopher J. Lewis, When Is A Trade Secret Not So Secret? The Deficiencies of 40
C.F.R. Part2, Subpart B, 30 ENvTL. L. 143, 153 (2000).
103. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973); see also Dep't ofthe Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352, 361 (1976).
104. Lewis, supranote 102, at 153.
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governmental operations. Critical in this regard is the existence of a
general individual right of access to government-held information."' 05
Notwithstanding this goal, FOIA recognizes that some information
should be secret. Therefore, FOIA includes a number of exemptions from
disclosure, including those for certain documents and information
regarding national defense, l"6 foreign policy,"0 7 law enforcement,' and,
as determined by the federal agency holding the information, commercial
trade secrets.0 9 As explained by the Supreme Court, Congress felt the need
for a trade secret exemption because "with the expanding sphere of
governmental regulation and enterprise, much of the information within
[g]overnment files has been submitted by private entities seeking
[g]overnment contracts or responding to unconditional reporting
obligations imposed by law."" 0 Despite the protection of trade secrets,
FOLA sets a default of disclosure"' unless one of the exemptions applies.
This default position effectively orients government towards disclosure
and away from secrecy (the opposite of trade secrecy, which protects
secrecy except in limited circumstances)." 2
Undeniably, government openness is recognized in a variety of modem
laws and rules. There are a number of examples of the value that the
United States government places on transparency." 3 They include judicial
decisions and statutes," 4 the exemption from copyright protection for
105. Project, Government Informationand the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971, 971
(1975).
106. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) (West 2006).
107. See id.
108. See id.§ 552(b)(7).
109. See id.§ 552(b)(4).
110. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979).
111. The very existence of a trade secret definition designed specifically for FOIA suggests
that the commercial definition is inappropriately applied to entities that operate in the governmental
or public infrastructure spheres. See generally FOIA Update, FOTA Counselor, U.S. Dep't of
Justice Webpage, http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiaupdatesNolIV_4/page6.htm (last visited Oct.
15, 2006) (questioning a broad application of trade secret law in light of then recent case law).
112. Additionally suggesting the orientation of democratic government towards openness is
what, in Australia, is known as the "reverse onus principle" for government secrets: "In order for
the court to be persuaded to protect a government secret, the government must establish that it is
in the public interest that the information not be disclosed. Further, the courts have been sceptical
[sic) of governments wishing to keep matters secret so that the onus on the government is a heavy
one." Pat Barrett, Public Private Partnerships-Are There Gaps in Public Sector Accountability?,
2002 Australasian Council of Public Accounts Committees (Feb. 3, 2003) (quoting AUSTRALIAN
SENATE FIN. & PUB. ADMIN. REFERENCES COMM. COMMONWEALTH CONTRACTS: A NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (2001), http://www.anao.gov.au/WebSite.nsf/Publications/
CF07591 C2441E5E74A256CC5002309BF.
113. Sandeen, supranote 4, at 398-400 (explaining the bases for government openness and
considering various exceptions to secrecy and control of information in government).
114. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No.94-1476, at 58-59(1976), reprintedin1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5671-73).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss1/2

26

Levine: Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrast

TRADE SECRETS IN OUR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

works of authorship created by United States government employees," 5
and the fact that governments post information on government websites.116
One court's explanation of the grounds for the government's exemption
from copyright protection is that the prohibition is "based on 'the necessity
of wide public dissemination of the contents of materials produced by and
relating to issues and problems of national interest ...[which] policy is
unquestionably a desirable one in a democracy, much of whose success is
dependent on a well informed public.""' 7 The well-informed public, a
basic value, is served by the absence of secrecy in information deemed "of
national interest" and therefore without a right to be obscured.
This value is now received wisdom in government, even in a society
increasingly transfixed with security issues. For example, Newt Gingrich,
former Speaker of the House of Representatives, promised that all
congressional documents and all House of Representatives conference and
committee reports would be filed electronically so that they would be
"available to any citizen in the country at the same moment it is available
to the highest-paid Washington lobbyist.""' Similarly, Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke's Senate testimony in November 2005 stated
that he supports monetary policy that is "increasingly transparent to the
public" because, among other reasons, a "more transparent policy process
increases democratic accountability.""' 9 These comments make one thing
clear: These values are entrenched in democratic government operations.
Government policies are thus often analyzed or criticized based upon their
adherence to these principles.
Of course, current government operations show that while politicians
may profess support of these values, in many instances these values may
not actually be followed. Consider the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the single most significant event causing the recent major reversal
of government openness. After the attacks, Attorney General John
Ashcroft revised FOIA standards to decrease the amount of information
subject to disclosure. 120 Although secrecy is sometimes justified, resulting
115. See id.(citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West 2006)).
116. Id.
117. Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 297 F. Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (quoting 12
ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 96, 105 (1961)); see supranote 114 and accompanying text.
118. James Love & Tim Hubbard, Payingfor Public Goods, in CODE: COLLABORATIVE

OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 207, 208 (Rishab Aiyer Ghosh ed., 2005) (quoting
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE

HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillespie et al. ed., 1994)).

119. Nomination ofBen S. Bernanke: Hearingon Nomination of Ben S. Bernanke to Become
Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban
Affairs, 109th Cong. 15 (2005) (testimony of Ben S. Bemanke).
120. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, New Attorney General FOIA Memorandum
Issued (Oct. 15, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001foiapostl9.htm.
Interestingly, the United States General Accounting Office found that 31% of federal agencies
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in the spotty and haphazard application of democratic values, the concepts
of transparency and openness still influence the system of government that
the United States regards as most legitimate and stable. A far cry from
Bentham's ideal, they remain values worth considering, and emulating,
when analyzing the effects of trade secrets in our public infrastructure.
B. Conflictfrom a Theoreticaland PracticalPerspective
The application of a doctrine designed to protect the competitive rights
of a chocolate producer. runs into problems when the product is not
chocolate, but voting machines. Once there is a deviation from purely
commercial concerns towards other goals for which trade secrecy was not
designed, like the quasi-governmental activity of providing public
infrastructure, the disconnect becomes severe. Trade secrecy and
democratic values collide in the private provision of public infrastructure.
As discussed more thoroughly below, trade secret law has a profound but
varying effect on both the ability of the public to easily access information
about public infrastructure, and on the government's capability to access
information that it deems necessary to serve and protect the public's
interest. The law effectively keeps secret the very operations of our
infrastructure and gives such protection the imprimatur of good policy.
Moreover, trade secrecy is now being directly linked to national
security issues. Thus, as the Federal Bureau of Investigation launches a
new effort to help United States businesses protect their trade secrets from
foreign thieves,' 2 and the Association of Corporate Counsel lobbies
Congress to amend the USA PATRIOT Act to further protect business
trade secrets from the Act's broad investigative powers,'23 some
consideration must be given to the countervailing concern that too much
protection may violate the public's right to information about their
essential public infrastructure, especially when provided by commercial
entities. As The Oregonianrecently editorialized regarding the efforts of
two of Portland's investor-owned energy utilities to keep their dealings
with failed energy giant Enron secret,
The most basic protection that consumers and investors
have against fraud is information. Enron and its fellow
conspirators literally lurked in the shadows-even the
decreased their release of information since this memorandum was released, a surprisingly low
number. See U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: AGENCY VIEWS ON
CHANGES RESULTING FROM NEW ADMINISTRATION POliCY

14, 24 (2003), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03981 .pdf.
121. See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (1 Pick.) 523, 523-24 (1837).
122. Kent Hoover, FBIto Help U.S. BusinessesProtectSecrets, BIzJouRNALS, Jan. 23, 2006,
http://www.bizjournals.com/extraedge/washingtonbureau/archive/2006/01/23f/bureaul .html.
123. Robert Block, Bush AntiterrorPlansIrkBig Business, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2005, at A4.
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blackouts, in Enron's case-where light could not be shed on
their dealings.
The best way to avoid a repetition of such schemes is to
make sure that public policy in Oregon continues to provide
the citizens of the state with open information on the
operation of the electric infrastructure that is critical for their
lives.'24
This example, and others described below, poses the ultimate question:
Should we allow private firms providing public infrastructure-even when
provided without significant government funding' 25-to enjoy that same
level of trade secrecy protection? The answer must be no. After examining
the interaction of these divergent theories and considering their application
in practice, what becomes clear is that, for example, FOIA's specifically
tailored exemptions from public disclosure-considered in the context of
a default position of transparency-are far more suited to private entities
engaged in the provision of public infrastructure than the broad doctrine
of trade secrecy. More broadly, it becomes clear that trade secrecy creates
far more problems than it solves when applied to public infrastructure.
1. The Current General Position of Courts and Commentators
In 1983, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held what might seem
intuitive to some: A "trade secret contention ceases to be of any moment
when the function is recognized as governmental, rather than that of a
private business."' 26 This opinion, however, is a minority view. Despite
these seemingly divergent goals and responsibilities, governments are
often allowed to hold their own information as trade secrets.12 7 And
indeed, commentators as renowned as Professor Epstein have taken the
position that "government has the same right as private parties to classify
information., 12' Epstein argues that so long as government meets the
relevant standard to establish a trade secret, it should be able to avail itself
relief to prevent that information
of that protection and seek "injunctive
129
hands.'
hostile
into
slipping
from
124. Robert McCullough, Op-Ed., Utilities and Trade Secrets, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 15,
2006, at C09, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/commentary/oregonian/
index.ssf?/base/editoriall 139957734174280.xml&coll=7.
125. Many businesses receive some form of public funding, whether by grants, subsidies, or
tax breaks. Here, I distinguish between government funded research and development, where
keeping such secrets from government is difficult to justify, and purely privately funded and
developed public infrastructure. It is this latter and more doctrinally challenging category that I
consider here.
126. Hoffman v. Pennsylvania, 455 A.2d 731, 733 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
127. Epstein, supra note 46, at 1044.
128. Id.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
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Professor Epstein's position is hardly controversial. As noted earlier,
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition mentions without
explanation that governmental organizations, among others, can hold trade
secrets, although the examples of trade secrets that it cites are more geared
towards non-profit and charitable organizations. 3 ' Additionally, the
UTSA's definition of "persons" subject to trade secret protection includes
governments and governmental subdivisions and agencies, again without
any analysis or commentary.' 3 ' Thus, commentators, legislators and courts
have been willing to extend trade secret protection to governmental and
non-profit entities.'32
2. Underlying Problems with Applying Trade Secret Law
to Public Infrastructure
To argue that government has a "right" to trade secrets seemingly
ignores the fundamental difference between a purely commercial entity
distributing private commercial goods and services, and an entity operating
in the public infrastructure sphere. Government commercial activity is
notably absent from both our traditional view of government and core
democratic values, and it is in that absence that the conflict between trade
secrecy and democratic values resides. At the elementary level,
government should not be in the business of keeping information secret
just because it might have pecuniary value.
Trade secret law cannot be easily squared with the notion that
commercial value is not a relevant consideration, at least not without
changing the very purpose of the law. Creating law that allows a business
to ethically maintain and increase its commercial power is its laudable
policy and purpose. What trade secret law does not contemplate is a
private actor taking on the role, if not the actual full responsibility, of a
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39 cmt. d (noting that "lists of
prospective members or donors" are examples of "economically valuable information" that a
governmental entity might claim as a trade secret).
131. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(3), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985).
132. Although not a focus of this Article, it is worth noting that a line of California federal
cases have held that a non-profit organization, in these cases the Church of Scientology, could hold
trade secrets if it met California's statutory requirements. See Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F.
Supp. 629, 633-34 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that the Church's "Advanced Technology" spiritual
materials met the California statutory definition of a trade secret because, among other reasons, the
Church "use[d] proceeds from the sale of these materials ... to support the operations" of the
Church); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the court
had previously held that the Church's "scriptures" were not trade secrets because the Church had
not alleged any commercial value assigned to them); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Commc'n. Servs., Inc., No. C-95-20091 RMW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23572, at *42 n.17 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 6, 1997) (entering a preliminary injunction against the disclosure of certain Church trade
secrets and noting that it is difficult to identify "potential competitors" of the Church for purposes
of the public knowledge element of the definition of a trade secret).
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public-oriented institution like government. The vastly divergent roles and
responsibilities of government, like transparency and accountability,
versus industry's premium on secrecy, profit-making, and competition,
make the application of trade secrecy to public institutions--or private
entities operating in the public sphere-troubling.'33
As a general matter, economist Joseph Stiglitz and others assert that "a
governmental entity should generally not be allowed to withhold
information from the public solely because it believes such withholding
'
increases its net revenue."134
Similarly, in the analogous case of
government contracting for services, Professor Minow has advocated that
such contracting "should not exempt the resulting activities from
adherence to public values."' 35 In that context, Hungary's "national
ombudsman" has stated that regarding the relationship between public
funds and private business, "[t]he transparency and controllability of the
privatization processes, as public interest, takes precedence over the
private interest of protection of business secrets."' 3 6 Building on these
assertions, I argue that a private entity engaged in the governmental
activity of providing public infrastructure should be held to a high standard
of accountability to the public. If we choose to maintain trade secrecy in
its current form, we run the risk of turning our infrastructure, upon which
the public relies to conduct its day-to-day activities, into just another
product that is bought and sold.
This outlook change should happen because of the fundamentally
133. Barrett, in his sweeping analysis of Australia's infrastructural public-private partnership
(PPP) arrangement, succinctly lays out the differing roles of commercial and public entities:
Unlike purely commercial entities, public service providers are required to
simultaneously account for (among other things) client satisfaction, the public
interest, fair play, honesty, justice, security and equity as well as striving to
maximise 'value for money'. The additional requirements derive, ultimately, from
the 'political' judgement passed (at intervals, through the electoral process) on
democratically elected governments' stewardship of public resources. The range
and relative importance ofthese additional requirements vary at points in time and
over time, not least because of changing public perceptions and expectations.
However, they remain the distinguishing feature of public sector accountability
compared to demands made of the private sector.
Barrett, supra note 112 (spelling in original).

134. JOSEPH STIGLITZ ET AL., THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN A DIGITAL AGE 70 (2000),
availableat http://archive.epinet.org/realmedia/010111/materials/stiglitz.pdf. Interestingly, Stiglitz
conversely argues that public entities should be entitled to hold patents "if only to avoid allowing
the patent to be reserved by someone else." Id.
135. MARTHA MINOw, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS 142 (2002).
136. Kenneth K. Baar, Open Competition, Transparency, and Impartiality in Local
Government Contracting Out of Public Services, in NAVIGATION TO THE MARKET: REGULATION
AND COMPETITION IN LOCAL UTILITIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 112

(Tams M. Horrth

& Gdbor Pteri eds., 2001), available at http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/200 1/76/Reg-Ch2.PDF.
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opposed value structures of government and commerce. This distinction
is starkly evident when considering the historical values driving people to
pursue public-oriented endeavors. While it may seem quaint today, it was
not terribly long ago that the Supreme Court noted, in the context of
considering whether government employees should be awarded patents for
work performed while employed by the government: "It has been said that
many scientists in the employ of the government regard the acceptance of
patent rights leading to commercial rewards in any case as an abasement
of their work.""' In testimony before the Senate Committee on Patents, an
employee of the Federal Bureau of Standards explained:
[A] good many scientific men object to applying for a patent
because they feel that it looks as though they were working
primarily for profit when in fact they are not; when they are
working for the development of science or perfecting some
process or method to which they have been
particular
appointed."'3
Of course, it is absurd to think that accepting a patent would be an
"abasement" of the work of a privately employed scientist; quite the
opposite, this achievement would be viewed as part of the scientist's job,
and personal pride and financial compensation would likely be its reward.
Moreover, the profit motive is the ultimate charge of a business, and a
business' employees, including those who may develop patentable
inventions and processes, share that common goal.'39
Conversely, those employed by government are not charged with the
institutional goal of turning a profit. 4 ° Intuitively, this must, in some
measure, change the perspective that individuals bring into their
employment, and that perspective should drive the orientation of the
institution. To suggest to a government scientist that she should orient her
efforts towards maximizing income to the government is almost as absurd
as telling a privately employed scientist that she should uniformly and
always consider the interests of the public over the interests of her
employer to turn a profit and remain in business.'41 Both changes in
orientation would require the employee to diminish in her mind and
137. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,219 (1933) (citing Exploitation
of Inventions by Government Employees: Hearingon S. 5065, S. 5066, and S. 5265 Before the S.
Comm. on Patents, 65th Cong. 16-17 (1919) (statement of James T. Newton, Commissioner of
Patents)).
138. Exploitationoflnventions by GovernmentEmployees: Hearingon S. 5065, S. 5066,and
S. 5265 Before the S. Comm. on Patents, 65th Cong. 17-18 (statement of E.B. Rosa, Chief
Assistant, Bureau of Standards).
139. STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 69.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 72-74.
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actions the main purpose for the existence of her employer. Thus, the
differing value structures found in the private and public sectors
undermine the application of an expansive commercial trade secrecy
doctrine to public infrastructure.
Moreover, the clash is evident when considering the fundamental
difference between the reasons that a government might wish to keep
information secret, like to protect the security of the nation, and a
business's trade-based and profit-oriented reasons. 4 2 Because of these
differences, courts have occasionally, and in my view, properly, refused
to apply trade secret law in the public sphere. For example, as held by the
Ohio Supreme Court considering this very question:
Respondents cite no authority, however, holding that a public
office can even have its own protected trade secrets... [T]his
court has held that the fact that disclosure of information will
result in a competitive disadvantage to the public institution
is not grounds for preventing disclosure... The protection of
competitive advantage in private, not public, business
underpins trade secret law. 143
Although subsequently superseded by a UTSA-based statute that now
allows governments to hold trade secrets,'" as the Ohio Supreme Court
decision explained, governments simply do not engage the same goals or
motivations as private sector entities. 4 5 Despite the regrettable fact that
Ohio discarded this distinction, it is a distinction with profound meaning.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has also recognized this
difference. 46
' It permitted the government to take aerial photographs of the
industrial complex of a regulated company, and denied that company trade
secret protection against those acts, utilizing, in part, similar logic:
"Whether they may be employed by competitors to penetrate trade secrets
is not a question presented in this case. Governments do not generally seek
to appropriate trade secrets of the private sector, and the right to be free of
142. Id. at 69.

143. State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Found., 602 N.E.2d 1159, 1163-64
(Ohio 1992) (citations omitted), superseded by statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1)(p)
(West 2000), as recognized in State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 721 N.E.2d 1044, 1051
(Ohio 2000) (noting that Ohio UTSA now allows for governments to have trade secrets).
144. Besser, 721 N.E.2d at 1051. This statutory change does not automatically mean that the
government can maintain a trade secret. See State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers v. Dayton Bd. of
Educ., 747 N.E.2d 255, 259 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (applying the Ohio UTSA and Besser standard

but finding no basis for trade secret protection of the names, applications, and resumes of people
who applied for a position with the Dayton Board of Education, and explaining that the court failed
to see "what independent economic value the ...information has or how other private persons
could reap some economic benefit from having it").
145. Besser, 721 N.E.2d at 1049.
146. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231-32 (1986).
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appropriation of trade secrets is protected by law."' 4 7 Again, the Court
acknowledged the distinction between public and private actors and their
respective roles in regulating and conducting commerce, and found that
commercial trade secret law was not applicable.' 48 More significantly, the
Court distinguished the application of trade secret law in this context by
focusing on the law's very reasons to exist, and found the absence of those
policy imperatives grounds to deny its application. 4 9 As these opinions
show, analysis of trade secret protection when the actor's goals are not
profit-oriented can render the entire doctrine inapplicable, if not entirely
irrelevant.
Further illustrating this incongruity is the fact that courts have also
recognized that even when applying trade secret law to governmental
activity, utilizing a broad commercial definition of a trade secret is not
appropriate when the focus is public values such as disclosure of
information through transparency. For example, in rejecting the use of the
Restatement of Torts definition of a trade secret 50 in FOIA's commercial
trade secrets exception to disclosure, 5 ' the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit explained:
[T]he [Restatement of Torts] definition, tailored as it is to
protecting businesses from breaches of contract and
confidence by departing employees and others under
fiduciary obligations is ill-suited for the public law context in
which FOIA determinations must be made .... The common
law definition was tailored to private contexts where public
policy almost exclusively focuses on the unjust enrichment
and competitive harm resulting when someone acquires a
business intangible through the breach of a contract or a
confidential relationship.... The Restatement approach, with
its emphasis on culpability and misappropriation, is illequipped to strike an appropriate balance between the
competing
interests of regulated industries and the general
52
public.
Thus, the court chose a narrower definition that allowed the disclosure of
"health and safety data" regarding intraocular lenses submitted by
regulated companies to the United States Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), despite the trade secrets exemption to FOIA."' The restrictive
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 232.
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OFTORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(4) (West 2006).
Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1288. Commentators have expressed concerns regarding the government's ability
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definition "incorporates a direct relationship between the information at
issue and the productive process," and thereby properly allowed for the
disclosure of information deemed to be worthy of disclosure in the public
interest and under the intent of FOIA. "4 It is this type of definition which
more closely mirrors the values of openness and transparency found in the
ideal democratic government.'55 Similar publicly oriented values should
exist with respect to public infrastructure, if public infrastructure is to
remain subject to unfettered public inspection.' 56
Building on this analysis, it is clear that trade secrecy is not a doctrine
that fits well in government or applies well to those engaged in the
provision of public infrastructure traditionally provided by governments.
Each element of trade secrecy, whether it be secrecy itself or "commercial
use," and the effects of maintaining a secret, whether it be its possible
unlimited duration or the possibility of hoarding information that might be
to disclose, either accidentally or purposefully, commercial trade secrets that it controls because
of its regulatory, contracting, and licensing capabilities. See generallyStephen R. Wilson, Public
DisclosurePolicies: Can a Company Still Protect Its Trade Secrets?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REv. 265
(2004) (discussing whistleblower protection and other laws that encourage public disclosure of
commercial information, often over the concerns regarding trade secrecy).
154. Pub. Citizen Health, 704 F.2d at 1288-89 (adopting a definition of a trade secret, for
purposes ofFOIA, "as a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said
to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort"); see also Dianna G. Goldenson,
FOJA Exemption Five: Will It Protect Government Scientistsfrom Unfair Intrusion?, 29 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 311, 330 (2002) (noting the difficulties that government scientists face of
"unfair intrusion into their scientific process-an intrusion not suffered by scientists in the private
sector because those individuals are not vulnerable to disclosure requests under FOIA").
155. It is worth noting that recent scholarship endorsing the notion of a common, open system
of infrastructure also illustrates this disconnect. Championed by numerous writers and philosophers,
these theories generally examine the theoretical disconnect between operating community resources
under restrictive intellectual property rights and the social and societal values that support and
encourage the sharing of information. While beyond the scope of this Article, the notion of public
infrastructure as a "commons" elevates the various societal benefits that are advanced by
emphasizing openness, rather than secrecy. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FuTuRE OF IDEAS 19-23
(2001) (arguing that there are benefits to holding resources as a commons, with the Internet being
the prime example, but noting that there must be a balance between private and public rights);
Yochai Benkler, SharingNicely: On ShareableGoods and the EmergenceofSharingas a Modality
of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 275-76 (2004) (analyzing "social sharing" and
"shareable goods," and the benefits of applying such ideas and principles to "the domain of sharing
rival material resources in the production of both rival and nonrival goods and services"); Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory oflnfrastructureandCommonsManagement, 89 MINN. L. REV.
917, 918-19 (2005) (examining the economics of managing infrastructural resources in an openly
accessible manner); Love & Hubbard, supra note 118, at 221-23 (discussing alternate methods of
financing public goods and noting the benefits of "data transparency").
156. As one commentator has noted, control and sharing are ultimately at odds in trade secrecy
doctrine. James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the ClassificationofObligations,
4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 74-76 (1999). Akin to the battles over defending the public domain, trade
secrecy shares this theoretical conflict.
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valuable to the public but not the private sector, stand in stark contrast to
what we expect, at least in theory, from democratic institutions. More
specifically, these values differ from what we should expect from entities
that take on governmental roles by seeking the financial rewards of
providing essential public infrastructure.
Because these guiding principles influence how trade secret law is
applied and what is deemed appropriate in a given circumstance, they must
be reconciled if trade secrecy is to have any place in public infrastructure.
However, reconciling these divergent values in the context of public
infrastructure is nearly impossible if any semblance of maintaining a
commercial secret is to be maintained. Moreover, the practical effects of
applying trade secrecy law to public infrastructure mean that such
reconciliation, even were it possible, is not a good choice. As discussed
below, because of these practical considerations, the better option is to
severely limit, or eliminate entirely, the application of the doctrine in this
context.
3. Concerns When Applying Trade Secret Law to Public
Infrastructure
To fully understand the examples in Part V and identify the real effects
of this problem, it is useful to consider the practical benefits and
drawbacks of elevating transparency and accountability over trade secrecy.
Aside from the underlying theoretical conflict that sets these doctrines in
opposition and requires that public values be elevated to at least an equal
footing with those of commerce, the practical effects of this tension
underscore the consequences of this mismatch. The benefits to businesses
of having trade secrets were outlined in Part I1, and because of the
legitimate reasons for maintaining trade secrecy in the commercial
context, an argument that such protection should be limited or eliminated
requires an examination of the possible benefits of disclosure both to the
public and to businesses. Even on a practical level, the benefits of
disclosure to the public outweigh the interests of businesses in trade
secrecy for the provision of public infrastructure.
Recent history demonstrates that when government has been
responsible for the provision of public infrastructure, it has engaged in
sweeping and candid discussion, with full information, of policy
alternatives and means to achieve infrastructural goals. Consider the
building of the Verrazano Narrows Bridge in the 1950s, connecting the
New York City boroughs of Staten Island and Brooklyn. Various
governmental agencies, public officials, business, and public advocates
engaged in a heated debate about the nature of the project.'57 Debated
157. See Jon J. Lines & Ellen L. Parker, The Politics ofInfrastructure:Robert Moses and the
Verrazano Bridge, in PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 165, 165-88 (Jay
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issues included funding, functions, and interaction with other public works
projects. 5 Studies were conducted, public and business advocates were
consulted, elected officials (like Governor Harriman) and heads of
regulatory agencies (including the legendary Robert Moses, who was, at
that time, the chairman of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
(TBTA)) weighed in with arguments and counter-arguments, testimony
was given before legislative committees, and The New York Times
editorialized.' 59 Indeed, Robert Moses wrote of his concerns about the
"moral right" of the TBTA to spend taxpayer dollars on the project."
The key, according to the authors of an analysis of these events, was
that the "political interaction among organizations [had] a decisive impact
on infrastructure planning."'' Such informed debate infused with public
discussion and consideration by multiple interested parties is difficult, at
best, to conduct when some or all of the very information needed for such
discussion is held by private actors and shielded from public view.
Because trade secrecy could perpetually impede public disclosure of much
information, the very possibility that the public would ever know what is
being considered by the government, or how such decisions are reached,
is dubious. Meaningful public debate, and the resultant benefits of full and
informed consideration of options and alternatives, is suppressed.
Aside from foreclosing meaningful debate and discussion, secrecy can
engender distrust and suspicion that is counter-productive for businesses
and its customers. Because we rely so heavily on public infrastructure,
secrecy becomes especially dangerous. As discussed in Part V, secrecy
means that we must guess at how elections are run, who can read our
email, and how data is transmitted through the Internet. Absent
information, these conditions can create paranoia because guesswork
replaces real and verifiable information. The public is left in the dark. The
late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in his excellent historical analysis
of secrecy as a form of government regulation, explained that the conflict
created 62by such a scenario is akin to "[i]gnorant armies clash[ing] by
1
night."
The result is that the public may worry about issues that, with adequate
information, could be discarded (or confirmed) as trivial (or real)
concerns. Potentially wasting energy and resources, the public under our
current system must choose between trust by faith and suspicion by
ignorance. While many people may not give this issue much thought, it is
M. Stein ed., 1988).
158. Seeid.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 180.
161. Id. at 187.
162. Richard Gid Powers, Introductionto DANIELPATRICKMOYNIAN, SECRECY 1, 16 (1998)
(quoting Moynihan and discussing at length the benefits to society of less governmental secrecy).
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difficult to ignore such concerns because we interact with this
infrastructure-roads, the Internet, governmental actions like law
enforcement-on a daily basis. In the absence of adequate information, the
public regularly uses infrastructure with limited or no knowledge as to
how it operates and how that form of operation impacts our daily lives.
Whether motivated partly by paranoia or not, the existence of public
watchdog websites like votersunite.org suggests the impact that secrecy
has on public confidence.' 63 This website reports on, among other topics,
election irregularities and the operation of voting machines, and it
encourages public efforts to change the election process.164 It states:
The abundance of practical problems with electronic voting
is not the fundamental violation of our democracy. The
fundamental violation is that when computers are used to
record and count votes, ordinary people cannot observe the
process. For a democracy to thrive, all citizens must be able
to observe the casting of their ballots and the counting of their
votes, not just observe computers processing their votes in
secret. 165
While this may seem to be an extreme position, and it is possible that such
websites would exist even if information were made public, there can be
no doubt that when Diebold refuses to make public the inner workings of
their voting machines, they feed the very concern that causes such a
website to exist. From a consumer confidence perspective alone, Diebold
would likely do better by not reinforcing these concerns.' 66
This problem is further compounded because maintaining such secrecy
evinces a lack of trust in the public, and in the case of items sold directly
to the government, like voting machines, in the government as well. While
businesses have often expressed legitimate concern about inadvertent
disclosure of trade secrets entrusted to the government as part of the

163. See Voters Unite!, http://www.votersunite.org/about.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
164. See Voters Unite!, http://www.votersunite.org/takeaction.asp (last visited Oct. 16,2006).
165. Id.
166. This is merely one of several such websites dedicated to examining voting systems and
irregularities, and pressuring election officials and machine manufacturers to disclose information
and improve the election process, or both. See, e.g., Black Box Voting,
http://www.blackboxvoting.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2006); California Voter,
http://www.calvoter.org/news/blog/index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006); Election Science
Institute, http://www.electionscience.org/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2006); North Cardina Coaltion for
Verified Voting, http://www.ncvoter.net/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2006); Verified Voting,
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2006); Where's the Paper Trail?,
http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). Also, a recent documentary on Home
Box Office entitled "Hacking Democracy" demonstrates the concerns of citizens voting in an
election process shrouded in secrecy.
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regulatory process,' 67 when the consuming public seeks basic information
about its own infrastructure, businesses' reaction should be different. By
taking the position that their trade secrets cannot be disclosed to a public
that uses and, in one form or another, pays for such infrastructure and
seeks to verify that it is working as it should, people may logically
conclude that there must be something to hide.
While there may be good business reasons for secrecy, such as
maintaining competitive advantages and capturing the value of
innovations, the legitimate concerns of the public should outweigh
commercial necessity. The business needs of a company fail to assuage a
public that is fighting to access basic information about its infrastructure's
operations. More importantly, the public at large should not be treated as
a competitor from whom valuable information should be denied. Rather,
in these contexts, the public is a consumer who wants and needs to know
what they are using to vote, communicate, and live life. The lack of trust
in the public-perceived or real-undermines the credibility that any
business would want to enjoy from its consumers.
The potential for increased confidence displayed by consumers in a
forthcoming company may lessen the sting of losing trade secrecy
protection. Beyond the damaging effects to public relations and confidence
of merely asserting that information should be secret, the poor fit of
commercial trade secrecy and public infrastructure manifests itself in more
concrete ways. A trade secret may be hoarded and kept
forever--eliminating the possibility that the secret could be examined,
shared, or improved upon by the public unless expensive or illegal steps,
like reverse engineering or misappropriation, respectively, are taken to
undermine trade secret protection.' 68 This condition makes theoretical
sense in the commercial world because, among other reasons, unfair
competition (like stealing a trade secret) violates general norms of ethical
business conduct and keeping certain information secret from competitors
is often believed (rightly or wrongly) to be a prudent business decision.'69
Trade secrecy's application in the public sector, on the other hand, makes
little sense where profit is not a concern, but accountability through
transparency is. This problem is made obvious by the fact that under
current law, Diebold may never have to affirmatively reveal its source
167. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
168. See supraPart III.B.3. This is one of the many factors that distinguish trade secrets from
patents, an arguably more "democratic" concept, and a topic explored more fully in Part VI.
169. Of course, time and effort are potentially wasted because duplicative research can occur
when one does not know what others are doing. That, however, is the commercial trade-off in trade
secrecy: The risk of duplicative effort is outweighed by the commercial advantage of maintaining
the secret. Considering the limited resources already applied to public infrastructure, seesupra note
32 and accompanying text, duplicative research and wasted effort should be minimized in this
context as much as is possible so as to maximize output in this underfunded sector of our society.
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code 7 ' to a public that relies upon it for the proper functioning of legal
elections and that may want to improve the operation of the elective
process beyond what is profitable to Diebold.
Additionally, the existence of the right to a perennial secret might make
sense in the commercial context where the owner of the secret runs the risk
of it being reverse-engineered or independently discovered. But, it also
creates incentives to aggressively guard against public disclosure, which
again forces the public into an informational darkness about infrastructure.
For example, to get the benefit of potentially infinite protection from
public disclosure (and indeed, any other benefit of trade secrecy), one must
meet the elements of a trade secret in the states in which the product might
be used or disclosed, including the most extensive requirements to
maintain secrecy. 7 ' Thus, because trade secret law is created by state laws
as opposed to one federal law, at least one commentator has noted that the
business incentive might be to adopt a confidentiality program that meets
the requirements of the72most restrictive state in which the information may
be used or disclosed.
In the technological sector, the possibility of maintaining a trade secret
infinitely can lead to such incentives as purposely designing awkward and
cumbersome computer protocols in order to raise the cost and decrease the
possibility of reverse engineering. 173 While one could legitimately question
the actual likelihood of a trade secret never being revealed, independently
discovered, or reverse engineered in a given situation, the more-than- 100year existence of the Coca-Cola formula trade secret renders the possibility
of an infinite trade secret more than theoretical. 174 Thus, if maintained as
trade secrets, the public could never have access to the operational
underpinnings of voting machines or the telecommunications system they
use to communicate with the government, businesses, and each other.
Furthermore, one of the major drawbacks of trade secrecy is
discouraging cooperation between businesses. While a business may
license a trade secret to another, licensing is a long way from free access
to information and the ability of the public to offer criticisms or
suggestions for improvement. The continued core of trade secrecy is
170. "A computer program's source code is the collection of files that can be converted from
human-readable form to an equivalent computer-executable form." Wikipedia, Definition ofSource
Code, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source-code (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). Source code allows
a computer to operate and perform the program's functions. See id.
171. See Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Casefor a FederalTrade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 427, 446 (1995).
172. See id. at 446-47.
173. See Douglas Lichtman, PropertyRights in EmergingPlatform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 615, 633-34 (2000) (noting that, in the context of platform technologies like desktop
computers or operating systems, current intellectual property law encourages developers to create
complex, rather than simple, processes and programs).
174. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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implied, i.e., the doctrine was not designed to encourage cooperation or
sharing of information, but to prevent it in order to preserve competitive
advantages between businesses.' 75
Cooperation can also create the apparatus to allow for improvements
in the provision of public infrastructure by way of public deliberation. Jon
Elster has written about the positive effects of public deliberation on the
conduct of the public's representatives in government.'76 Defined as the
"civilizing force of hypocrisy," Elster explains that "[g]enerally speaking,
the effect of an audience is to replace the language of interest by the
' 77
language of reason and to replace impartial motives by passionate ones."'
Similarly, the effect of forcing public infrastructure providers to have their
products and services discussed in a public forum would, at least arguably,
force these private providers to implement improvements and foster in
them more appreciation of the public roles that they have engaged. At a
minimum, it would create an atmosphere in which the public's judgment
of the merits of a particular good or service could not be easily ignored.
While one could argue that if society wants to reap the benefits
(whatever they may be) of a private entity providing public infrastructure
then it must pay some of the price (like allowing that entity to turn a profit
by standard commercial means and tactics), it cannot be that these
commercial entities can simply conduct their business without reference
to the responsibilities that should become their burden. 7 To hold
175. Brett Frischmann, in a talk at the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School
regarding his economic theory of infrastructure, noted that sharing may benefit private businesses
and that it is not always the case that sharing would result in lost value. See Brett M. Frischmann,
Lecture at the Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society: An Economic Theory of
Infrastructure (and a Normative Argument for Promoting Sustainable Infrastructure Commons)
(Mar. 8,2004), availableathttp://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/events/archives/brett-m-frischmann.shtml
(follow "Listen to Professor Frischmann's talk" hyperlink). In his opinion, businesses need to be
educated as to where such benefits might reside. Id.
176. John Elster, Deliberationand ConstitutionMaking, in DELiBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97,
111 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
177. Id. While beyond the scope of this Article, Elster's detailed explanation of this notion is
an extremely thought-provoking and practical analysis of the positive effects of public deliberation
in recent social science scholarship.
178. See LESSIG, supra note 155, at xviii (disapproving of former Federal Communications
Commission Chairman Michael Powell's argument that there was an economic need to give cable
operators free reign over "their property" if they were going to invest in building the "infrastructure
of the information superhighway"). If these operators chose to discriminate over what could be
done on their resource, Powell argued, such was the price to pay for their investment. Id. Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court has found that public and private interests can become so
enmeshed that the private entity's actions are imputed to the public entity. See Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716-17, 725 (1961) (involving a pre-Civil Rights Act
issue in which a privately-owned restaurant, leasing space in a publicly-owned building, refused
to serve an African-American, and holding that the "State has so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity" and finding the State in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). It stands to
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otherwise would be to allow businesses to conduct public business, and,
for all practical purposes, mimic roles normally played by government,
without taking on the responsibilities of a public actor.
Additionally, allowing the providers of public infrastructure to set the
terms of the public's interaction with their products and services, which in
the instances described below is in fact what is happening, moves society
into the realm of "code as law," as articulated by Lawrence Lessig' 79 The
choice of "modalities of regulation," such as law, norms, architecture, or
the market, determines what values are emphasized. 8 ' When the modality
of regulation adheres to the values that, as a society, we believe should
exist in the product or service, then this phenomenon is of marginal
concern. However, in the present context, regulation is thrust upon the
public by the private sector through its very provision of infrastructure.
Businesses are making the decisions, often without much public input or
involvement, as to the nature, scope, and capabilities of our public
infrastructure. Backed by notions like trade secrecy, this public
infrastructure-and its "code"-embodies not public, but commercial
values.
As Christoph Engemann has noted in the context of voting machines,
"If the code gains regulatory power and is meant to contribute to the public
good it needs to be accessible and disputable just like the law is readable
and disputable (at least by lawyers[)]." 81 To allow public infrastructure to
be provided without public debate ultimately undermines democracy by
frustrating that basic tenet. Code developed by the private sector, at least
in the United States, has indeed become regulatory: "Code" is our public
infrastructure, is stifling public access to information and informed debate
about how our public infrastructure should operate, and is in many cases
entirely inaccessible and therefore indisputable.
What is clear is that businesses are, in significant respect, governing in
the public sense. They are providing a public service by providing public
infrastructure, often in the place of government. But they are also
economically benefitting, reaping profits and opening markets previously
foreign to private industry. Therefore, in these instances, they should take
on certain governmental responsibilities and observe certain public duties,
reason that the converse should be true: Private entities can become so enmeshed in public
activities, like providing municipal wireless Internet access, or governmental functions, like
manufacturing and selling voting machines, or both that they should be held to a higher standard
of responsibility akin to that of the government to the public.
179. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)

(outlining and analyzing the phenomena in the Internet realm that allow code-the software and
hardware that forms cyberspace-to dictate the nature and freedoms inherent in it).
180. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 661,686-87 (1998)
(noting how different modes of regulation may produce and displace certain values).
181. Posting of Christoph Engemann to Engemann Blog, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
blogs/engemannlarchives/003663.shtml (Dec. 5, 2005, 7:07 PST).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss1/2

42

Levine: Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrast

TRADE SECRETS IN OUR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

like informing the public of their operations and activities. This trade-off
recognizes the fact that in a commercial market the public will often pay
(in one form or another) for these services, but that it has a right to
disclosure when companies supplant or replace government in the role of
provider.
As discussed above, abandonment of secrecy as a business strategy
may also benefit the businesses themselves, even were trade secrecy
displaced by other more democratic forms of commercial protection, like
patent. 182 In the end, given the extremely expansive nature of modem trade
secret law, the application of the law to the public infrastructure scenario
must change if we wish to retain any notion of public participation in the
process that creates and maintains our public infrastructure.
V. THE CONFLICT AS IT EXISTS TODAY

Because of notions like reverse engineering and independent discovery,
trade secrecy law is often considered a relatively weak source of protection
for business, as compared to copyright and patent. However, the scenarios
below suggest that in the public infrastructure context, the law is more
powerful than previously believed. It is in the practical manifestation of
these conflicts that the true dichotomous elements of trade secrecy and
government values are illustrated, and in the ensuing quarrel, secrecy wins;
transparency and accountability are consistently on the losing end. By
examining three representative scenarios, it becomes apparent that public
infrastructure operates in the shadows. The import of the information
hidden from view is remarkable, and requires a significant change in the
law.
A. Example One: Cisco Systems Inc. v. Michael Lynn
Take, as a first example, the operations of the Internet-an increasingly
essential public infrastructure used by both government and the global
public. In the summer of 2005, Michael Lynn (Lynn) was asked by his
employer, Internet Security Systems, to reverse engineer Cisco Internet
Operating System (lOS), the operating system running Cisco Systems'
(Cisco) routers owned by private and public entities."' Based upon that
182. See infra Part VI (analyzing the tradeoff to businesses and the potential impact of
abandonment).
183. "A router acts as ajunction between two networks to transfer data packets among them."
See Wikipedia, Definition of Router, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Router (last visited Oct. 14,
2006). While one could question whether a privately-owned router is part of public infrastructure
(a topic that I intend to explore in a future project on the modem definition of public infrastructure),
there is no dispute that routers are fundamental to the orderly operation of the Internet. As Cisco
noted in a press release announcing a new product created in an alliance with Fujitsu, "Networks
have become lifelines for public infrastructure and corporate IT systems, leading to ever-increasing
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research, Lynn planned to reveal a security vulnerability in Cisco's routers
to Black Hat, a conference of computer security experts and hackers.' 84
The security vulnerability, known as "exploit code," demonstrated an
ability to remotely execute code on Cisco routers, thereby controlling and
taking over the operation of the router.8 5
While Cisco had corrected the flaw and stopped distributing computer
code that would allow for this exploit to work, Lynn believed that Cisco
did not do enough to encourage its customers to correct the problem by
upgrading the software on their routers, and that it had not explained why
this was necessary.186 In response to Lynn's employer's instructions not to
give the presentation, Lynn quit his job and planned the presentation
anyway.187 Significantly, however, the planned presentation did not reveal
sufficient information for one to recreate the "exploit code" without, at
best, "a lot of work."'88
Upon hearing of the planned presentation, Cisco quickly brought an
action against Lynn and Black Hat. It sought, among other relief, an
injunction against Lynn giving the presentation and thereby disclosing
Cisco's alleged trade secrets.' 89 Cisco argued, in part, that Lynn and Black
Hat violated California's trade secrets law 90 by misappropriation because
Cisco's trade secrets were "acquired improperly through the breech [sic]
of an agreement to keep them secret."' 9'
The result: Lynn settled with Cisco. 92 The terms of the settlement were
requirements for quality and reliability." Press Release, Fujitsu Ltd. & Cisco Sys., Inc., Fujitsu and
Cisco Deliver Next-Generation High-End Routers Based on Strategic Alliance (May 24, 2005),
available at http://www.intemetadsales.comimodules/news/ article.php?storyid=5630. Thus, as
such routers serve as a vital piece of networking equipment that allows for access to all comers of
the Internet, I submit that they constitute part of our public infrastructure.
184. Kim Zetter, Router Flaw Is a Ticking Bomb, WIRED, Aug. 2, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,68365-0.htnil.
185. See Posting of Jennifer Granick to The Shout: Opinions on Everything,
http://www.granick.com/blog/archive2005_08_01_theshoutarchive.html#1 12302921362405957
(Aug. 2, 2005, 17:28 PST). Jennifer Granick, Executive Director of Stanford Law School's Center
for Internet and Society, represented Lynn in the ensuing litigation.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. Indeed, Granick asserts that Lynn did not even possess secret "source code," but rather
"binary code" that is actually sold by Cisco. Posting of Jennifer Granick to The Shout: Opinions
on Everything, http://www.granick.com/blog/archive/2005_08 01 theshout archive.html#
112311806179768898 (Aug.3,2005, 18:10 PST).
189. Complaint at 7-8, Cisco Sys., Inc. v.Lynn,No. 05-CV-03043 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27,2005),
availableat http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/McCloyamended-complaint.pdf.
190. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.11 (West 2006).
191. Complaint, supranote 189, at 6.
192. While Granick was confident that Lynn could have defeated the trade secrets claim
because (a) the subject code was not actually secret, (b) reverse engineering is allowed under
California law, and (c) this claim was more akin to a breach of contract action than
misappropriation of a trade secret, she believed that it was in the interest of Lynn to settle rather

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol59/iss1/2

44

Levine: Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrast

2007]

TRADE SECRETS IN OUR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

broad and effectively ended any further dissemination of this information.
Lynn agreed, in part, to be enjoined from "disclosing or disseminating" the
information, reverse engineering Cisco's code, and using the code "for any
purpose."' 93 Additionally, Lynn agreed to identify to whom, if anyone, he
disclosed the alleged trade secrets, and return the fruits of his labor to
Cisco's counsel, who would eventually destroy the data.'94
Given Cisco's router production dominance, the settlement effectively
ended the public dissemination and informed discussion of these potential
security vulnerabilities (by one measurement, Cisco had 55.7% of the
Internet's "big router" market).'95 That Cisco could bring a trade secret
misappropriation action under such circumstances, and force parties to
litigate or enter into agreements to maintain the secrecy of security
information is, I propose, a superb example of the problem with the current
law. California's broad definition of a trade secret, which tracks the
expansive definition found in the UTSA,' 96 at least arguably covered the
subject information and made the question of whether this information was
covered by the law subject to some dispute.
The result of bringing this action rendered difficult, if not impossible,
any further examination or informed discussion of this potential problem
as identified by Lynn, who spent time seeking to understand the issues and
its ramifications for the benefit of the public. Information regarding the
operations of a basic element of the Internet that could be used to
compromise it was protected as a secret. Such information should be made
public, especially in the absence of a public solution to the problem,
because the potential impact of a major failure of these routers would shut
down much of the Internet, a major public infrastructure.
The fact that it was Lynn, an individual unauthorized by Cisco to
examine the routers, who identified and exposed this problem, underscores
the need for the public-and not certain limited individuals chosen by
government or even watchdog groups-to have access. To allow chosen
individuals, whether the government or third-party escrow agents, limited
access puts undue power in the hands of the party selecting the lucky few,
than fight because the terms of the settlement required Lynn to do things that he was, for the most
part, willing to do anyway. See Granick, supra note 188. The logical and, from her client's
perspective, proper goal was to "get out of the case as unscathed as possible." Id.
193. Stipulated Permanent Injunction at 1-2, Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Lynn, No. 05-CV-03043 (N.D.
Cal. July 28, 2005), available at http://www.siliconvalleysleuth.com/files/
stipulated_permanent injunction.DOC.
194. Stipulated Permanent Injuction, supra note 193, at 3-4.
195. Scott Moritz, CiscoMaintainsRouterLead on Juniper,THESTREET.COM, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://www.thestreet.com/pf/tech/scottmoritz/10238750.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). "[B]ig
routers" are the hardware "used at central junction points to direct data traffic." Id. That Cisco's
routers may ultimately be purchased by governments and used in the operation of public
infrastructure underscores the need for reexamining trade secrecy's application.
196. See CAL. Cwy. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2006).
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and even more power in the hands of those who control the information.
The next Lynn might be someone no person in power knows; and her
contribution could be significant.
More significantly, the public's right to access this information was
completely subjugated to the marginal claim that some of this information
might qualify as a trade secret. The chilling effect of such claims,
including the need for a defendant to expend time and energy litigating,
makes settlement a reasonable choice in many circumstances. In this case,
it also meant that this information remained subject to laws designed to
protect Cisco's interest, not the public's. In fact, it could deter the
uninformed from future efforts to access such information by reverse
engineering for fear of somehow violating the law. At the end of the day,
the law contributed to forcing a settlement that kept crucial information
away from the public, about an infrastructure that is now, in many
respects, the backbone of public infrastructure.
B. Example Two: Voting Machines and DieboldElection
Systems, Inc.
As a second example, consider Diebold's provision of voting machines
to certain states. Diebold has repeatedly refused to reveal source code used
in the operation of its voting machines for public inspection to assure the
company's suitability to conduct accurate elections.'97
In November 2005, Diebold refused to comply with a North Carolina
law that requires vendors of electronic voting machines to place, among
other items, "all software that is relevant to functionality, setup,
configuration, and operation of the voting system," including its source
code, "in escrow with an independent escrow agent approved by the State
Board of Elections."9' The law is designed to "restore public confidence
in the election process" by requiring that such information be provided to
the state so as to support and test voting systems. 199 inthe ensuing action
brought by Diebold against the North Carolina State Board of Elections
(BOE) to seek a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of the statute 20 Diebold alleged that it could not
197. The United States Government Accountability Office has recently noted that "security
and reliability" remains a concern for "electronic voting systems." U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, ELECTIONS: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SECuRrrY AND RELIABILITY OF ELECTRONIC
VOTING SYSTEMS ARE UNDER WAY, BUT KEY ACTIVITIES NEED TO BE COMPLETED 2 (2005). See

infra note 206.
198. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-165.9A(a)(1) (West 2006).
199. General Assembly of North Carolina, 2005 N.C. Sess. Law 323, 323 (West).
200. Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Motion to Modify or Vacate
Temporary Restraining Order at 1-2, Diebold Election Sys., Inc. v. N.C. State Bd.of Elections, No.
05-CVS- 15474 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/Activism/Evoting/20051117_Diebold vNCMotion.pdf.
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provide some of the required information because the information
belonged to third parties, and thus was not controlled by, or in the custody
of, Diebold.20 ' Consequently, Diebold alleged that it could not submit a
vendor proposal meeting
all state law requirements without "being in
20 2
violation of state law.
The court eventually held, in essence, that Diebold must comply with
the law if it wanted to do business with the state. 203 Diebold responded,
however, that it could not disclose source code because of license
agreements, and because some of the code belonged to third parties who
would be unwilling to disclose it." 4 After another round of court battles,
which ensued after the BOE approved Diebold (notwithstanding its
inability to comply with the law), Diebold chose not to do business with
the state.20 5
That trade secret law or principles of secrecy or both are at play here,
even if not explicitly stated, is confirmed by Diebold's explanation to the
BOE that "we believe it is impossible for any vendor of an election system
to say that they have access to all of the source code in question or that it
is all in escrow somewhere., 206 This is a true Pyrrhic victory: Although the
state won the initial court battle, the power of trade secrecy principles
201. Complaint at6-8, 10, Diebold Election Sys., Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 05CVS-15474 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/Activism/Evoting/diebold complaint.pdf.
202. Complaint, supranote 201, at 10.
203. Gary D. Robertson, N.C. Judge Declines Protectionfor Diebold,ABC NEWS, Nov. 28,
2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wirestory?id=1354023; see also Order of Dismissal at
1, Diebold Election Sys., Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 05-CVS-15474 (N.C. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/dieboldorder-dismissal.pdf.
204. Anne Broache, North CarolinaDefends E- Voting Certifications,CNETNEWS.COM, Dec.
2, 2005, http://news.com.com/North+Carolina+defends+e-voting+certifications/2100-1028_35980671 .html?tag=mainstry (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
205. Letter from Charles R. Owen, Div. Counsel, Diebold Election Sys., Inc., to Gary Bartlett,
Executive Dir., N.C. State Bd. of Elections (Dec. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/Diebold%20Folder/Barrett/ 20Lette/ 2012-21-05-1 .pdf; see also
infra note 211 and accompanying text.
206. Letter from Charles R. Owen to Gary Bartlett, supranote 205, at 1. Diebold has argued
that such information is akin to trade secrets in other cases. See Response to Plaintiffs' Post Hearing
Letter and Supplemental Declaration, and Request for Early Status Conference or Reference to
Mediation at 3, Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., No. 03-4913JF (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2003),
availableat http://www.eff.org/legal/ISP_liability/OPG-vDiebold/DieboldResponse.pdf(noting
that "Diebold has informally encouraged the students to refrain from publishing passwords, source
codes, information protected by employees' privacy interests and trade secret-type information,
none of which is essential for purposes of criticism."); Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Transparency and
Access to Source Code in Electronic Voting 9 (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.usenix.com/events/evt06/tech/full.papers/hall/hall.pdf (noting that voting machine
vendors have asserted trade secret protection over their software). Of course, as discussed above,
access to source code is essential for understanding how a voting machine operates. Id. at 3 (noting
that "[a]ccess to source code supports independent technical evaluation of voting systems that, in
turn, facilitates oversight and accountability of software").
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presumably remained, because protection of secrets was not overruled or
overridden by the concerns of the public as manifested by the laws of the
state. Thus, Diebold could focus on states where trade secrecy law is
completely impermeable to public-law overrides.
More recently, computer hackers successfully broke into Diebold's
voting machines owned by Leon County, Florida to test their vulnerability
to manipulation. What made this event particularly unusual was that the
hackers were given access to the Diebold machines by Leon County
Supervisor of Elections Ion Sancho.2 °7 Diebold's response to being
informed of four successful hacks of their machines, which one hacker
likened to "prestuffing a ballot box," was to say that these tests were
"invalid" and "potential violations of licensing agreements and intellectual
property rights."20 8 Sancho replied that "[m]ore troubling than the test
itself was the manner in which Diebold simply failed to respond to my
concerns or the concerns of citizens who believe in American elections. '209
Identifying the heart of the problem, Sancho also lamented, "I really think
they're not engaged in this discussion of how to make elections safer.""21
It is difficult to find a more fundamental public infrastructure than a
voting machine. Sadly, however, even when the very ability to conduct an
accurate and verifiable election is at issue, trade secrecy wins the day.
Secrecy supported by the law resulted in a private actor being able to argue
against traditional governmental notions of transparency and
accountability and disengage from public discussion about proven
vulnerabilities of their products. True, one could conceive lawful ways to
access this trade secret information in the absence of contractual
prohibitions, like reverse engineering. But the fact that legislatures have
to pass laws mandating that source code about voting machines must be
available to the state, and state boards of elections and officials charged
with operating fair and accurate elections have to jump through such legal
hoops (and may not be successful in doing so) reflects a balance that is
skewed in favor of commercial interests and against those of the public.
The risk of being able to prestuff a ballot box was not enough for Diebold
to concede that public disclosure of the inner workings of the machines
207. Zachary Goldfarb, As Elections Near, Officials Challenge Balloting Security, WASH.
POST, Jan. 22, 2006, at A6, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/21/AR2006012101051.html.
208. Marc Songini, Q&A: E- Voting Systems HackerSees 'ParticularlyBad' SecurityIssues,
COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 19,2006, http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics /security/hacking/
story/0, 10801,107881,00.html.
209. See Goldfarb, supra note 207.
210. See id.Diebold, and two other voting machine vendors, apparently now refuse to deal
with Leon County, which has prompted the Florida Attorney General to issue subpoenas to those
companies. Marc Songini, FloridaAttorney GeneralQuestionsE- Voting Vendors 'Decision to Shun
County, COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 4, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/
govemment/legalissues/story/0, 10801,110192,00.htrnl.
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might be appropriate, even if for no other reason than to prove that it took
the issue seriously and had nothing to hide from the public. The law must
step in to force such change.
Moreover, one significant additional element in the Diebold-North
Carolina scenario underscores the inability of government to always be a
third-party ombudsman for, or protector of, the public's interest. As
mentioned earlier, immediately after Diebold refused to comply with the
law, and in the face of their refusal to do so, the BOE in effect nullified the
law and actually approved Diebold as a vendor, noting that none of the
winning applicants could comply with the law's requirement that all
source code be placed in escrow.2 ' Moreover, a court challenge to that
decision was unsuccessful,2"2 and, ultimately, the only fact that prevented
the use of Diebold's machines in North Carolina was Diebold's decision
to withdraw from the state. Suggesting that this is a law that can be
followed and that businesses might serve a market in which trade secrecy
is not sacrosanct, rival vendor Election Systems & Software agreed to
comply with the state's law. 213
Thus, aside from trade secrecy law defeating the disclosure law in
practice, the notion that a government-controlled or designated entity
could adequately protect the interests of the general public is dubious, and
would turn on many variables that might undermine the third party's
ability to operate in a completely public-oriented fashion. Indeed, where
a state agency effectively nullifies a law designed to protect the public's
interest, the entire basis upon which an escrow regime would be
built-that is, trusting the entity charged with examining the escrowed
material-is undermined. Thus, it is not readily apparent that a third-party
(governmental or otherwise) might adequately protect the general interests
of the public.214
C. Example Three: Citywide Wireless Internet (Wi-Fi)
One of the major public infrastructure goals of many municipalities is
to provide high-speed Internet access to all of its residents. President
211. Broache, supra note 204; see also Amended Verified Complaint for Writ of Mandamus
at 17, McCloy v. N.C. State Bd. ofElections, No. 05-CVS- 16878 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19,2005),
available at http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/mccloy.amendedcomplaint.pdf.
212. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Litigation, http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/
(last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
213. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, After EFF Litigation, Diebold Pulls Out of North
Carolina (Dec. 23, 2005), http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2005_1 2.php.
214. See Hall, supranote 206, at 6 (noting that it is unclear whether the North Carolina statute
will be enforced). While one could argue that my concern is more with government than with the
operation of trade secrecy doctrine, it is again the idea that laws must be passed, litigation must be
commenced, and extensive effort must be made for companies to reveal such information that
makes trade secrecy doctrine problematic in this context.
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George W. Bush has mentioned access to "the information that is
transforming our economy through broadband technology" by setting the
goal of "broadband technology to every comer of our country by the year
' Democrats in the House of
2007 with competition shortly thereafter."215
Representatives, led by Rep. Nancy Pelosi, have articulated a similar
goal.2 16 These goals are being implemented by cities that see citywide
wireless networks as helpful to low-income residents by providing access
to the Internet, building public-safety networks, connecting city agencies,
and aiding economic development by luring people into cities. 1 7 A brief
examination of two cities' efforts, Philadelphia and San Francisco,
illustrates the trade secret issues at play.
In July 2004, the city of Philadelphia embarked on the development of
a citywide Wi-Fi system by forming a non-profit corporation called
"Wireless Philadelphia" to examine the possibility of citywide Wi-Fi and
develop a plan for its implementation. 18 It explained in its "Wireless
Philadelphia Business Plan" that the basic goal and role of government in
the project was to provide "the framework and initial investment needed
to fully exploit this opportunity," noting the traditional fact that "the public
sector will need to serve as the catalyst to ensure that affordable broadband
Internet access is widely available to all the residents of Philadelphia."2 9
After an extensive bidding process, in October 2005 Wireless
Philadelphia announced a public-private partnership and chose the
company EarthLink to "fund, build and manage" the network; no city tax
dollars would be used. In essence, under the plan EarthLink will provide
the Wi-Fi infrastructural backbone, and individual Internet service
providers will sell access.22 Significantly, however, Wireless Philadelphia
retained some reversion rights to the intellectual property of its potential
vendors in its "Request for Proposals for a Citywide Wireless Network"
215. Press Release, White House, President Unveils Tech Initiatives for Energy, Health Care,
Internet (Apr. 26, 2004), availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/200404266.html.
216. See Anne Broache, Democrats Unveil 'InnovationAgenda,' CNETNEWS.coM, Nov. 15,
2005, http://news.com.com/2100-1034_3-5953520.html (quoting Rep. Pelosi as saying, "Universal
broadband-whether it's delivered by Wi-Fi or WiMax, or hard line-will put all Americans, no
matter where they live, no more than a keystroke or a mouse click away from the jobs and
opportunity broadband both creates and supports ... ").
217. Marguerite Reardon, CiscoEnters Citywide Wireless Market, CNETNEWS.COM, Nov. 15,
2005, http://news.com.com/2100-7351_3-5952090.html.
218. See Wireless Philadelphiarm Business Plan presented to Honorable John F. Street, Mayor
of Philadelphia, PA 7-8 (Feb. 9, 2005), availableat http://www.wirelessphiladelphia.org/pdfs/
Wireless-Phila-Business-Plan-040305-1245pm.pdf.
219. Id. at 9-10.
220. Declan McCullagh, EarthLink Wins Philly Wi-Fi Contract, CNETNEWS.CoM, Oct. 4,
2005, http://news.com.con/2100-7351_3-5888494.html (quoting Dianah Neff, Philadelphia's chief
information officer); see also Wireless Philadelphia WI-FI Project Update December 2005,
http://www.wirelessphiladelphia.org/pdfs/WPUpdateDec_2005.pdf.
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(RFP). In a clause entitled "Reversion to Wireless Philadelphia," it
reserved the right to be "granted all licenses to intellectual property
necessary for operation and maintenance of the [wireless system]" in the
event of a "material, uncorrected and persistent failure" of the system to
meet the terms of the contract with Wireless Philadelphia. 22' Thus,
although not apparently requiring that all trade secrets and other
intellectual property be made generally available to it, Wireless
Philadelphia apparently recognized that it would need access to such
information if its vendor did not correct systemic and persistent
problems.222
Contrast Wireless Philadelphia's process with the current nascent
efforts of the city of San Francisco. San Francisco, similar to Philadelphia,
has created the TechConnect venture and is seeking to develop a citywide
Wi-Fi system that would cost taxpayers "little or nothing," in an effort to
promote "digital inclusion" for all of San Francisco's residents. It has
sought proposals from potential vendors in the form of a Request for
Information and Comment (RFI/C) and a subsequent RFP, but city
officials would not detail the contents of any RFI/C, for fear that they may
include trade secrets.2 23 Moreover, the RFP includes two provisions that
provide that the City of San Francisco will make public the complete
contents of industry-submitted proposals except redacted information that
qualifies as a trade secret under California law. 224 Based upon the
221. WIRELESS PHILADELPHIA, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS FOR A CTYWIDE WIRELESS
NETWORK 38, available at http://www.wirelessphiladelphia.org/pdfs/WP%20RFP%204-505%20rev 0/o20v4-CLEAN.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
222. The Wireless Philadelphia Broadband Network Agreement ("Agreement"), executed on
February 21, 2006 between EarthLink and Wireless Philadelphia, includes a paragraph entitled
"Confidentiality." Wireless Philadelphia Broadband Network Agreement 1, 24-25, available at
http://www.wirelessphiladelphia.org/pdfs/NetworkAgreement for PDF.pdf [hereinafter
Agreement]. It includes extensive protection for confidential information and trade secrets of
EarthLink. Indeed, "confidential information," which cannot be disclosed to third parties except
under certain limited circumstances, is defined to include "all information concerning EarthLink,
its business plans, pricing, proprietary rights, [s]ubscribers, customers and suppliers." Id. While
some ofthis data, like subscriber information, may rightfully be held in confidence, it would appear
that EarthLink could attempt to designate a wide variety of information, like information regarding
security, as confidential. Indeed, the publicly-released exhibits to the Agreement include three
redactions for technical information deemed "confidential and propriety." Agreement, supra,at
http://www.wirelessphiladelphia.org/pdfs/WP%20EL-Network-Agreement-Exhibits.pdf.
It is
impossible to determine the import of that redacted information, which is precisely the problem.
223. Stefanie Olsen, GoogleFacesObstaclesin S.F. Wi-FiBid, CNETNEWS.COM, Oct. 3,2005,
http://news.com.com/2102-7351_3-5887919.html?; see also CITY& CouNTYoF S. F., REQUEST FOR
INFORMATION AND COMMENT 2005-07 6 (Aug. 16, 2005), availableat http://www.sfgov.org/site/
uploadedfiles/dtis/techconnect/BroadbandFinalRFIC.pdf; CITY & COUNTY OF S. F., REQUEST FOR
PROPOSALS 2005-19 (Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter RFP 2005-19], available at
http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/dtis/techconnect/TechConnectRFP_2005-19_12-2205Revl-17-06.pdf.
224. See RFP 2005-19, supra note 223, at 12, 17 (encompassing Articles 3.3 and 6.10).
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information covered by this exclusion of public dissemination, the topics
might include information regarding the structure of a partnership orjoint
venture submitting a proposal, details of similar projects performed by the
proposer, and estimates of the "up-front and on-going capital and
operating costs to design, build and manage" the system.225 Therefore, the
public at large may be denied significant information by which to consider
and offer comments to the city about its potential vendor selection.226
These two examples illustrate the impact that restrictive trade secret
law has on a public bidding process for the provision of public
infrastructure. These cities are forced to recognize the rights of the bidders
to broad trade secret protection under the terms of current trade secret
definitions that focus exclusively on commercial concerns. While the cities
may attempt to modify those definitions by way of discrete contract terms,
the fact remains that it is the broad commercial definition of a trade secret
that will likely determine the ultimate rights of the public to access
information about the infrastructure we may ultimately use to access the
Internet.
Moreover, these examples suggest what would happen if private
commercial interests, like secrecy, were not an issue. The City of San
Francisco has an open government ordinance; the first words of the
ordinance declare, "Government's duty is to serve the public, reaching its
decisions in full view of the public., 227 However, according to one news
report, San Francisco's RFI/C attracted over twenty bids, of which some
were "entirely secret," while others were 90% redacted. 228 Additionally,
the first TechConnect meeting was reportedly exempt from the city's Open
Government Sunshine Ordinance because of the vendors' "commercially
sensitive proposals., 229 Were these businesses not protected by law that
encourages and supports the submission of secret bids to the city, the
meetings and decisions of TechConnect would be subject to far greater
public scrutiny. In other words, were the government the provider of this
service, there would be no commercial interest-and hence less secret
information-to protect.
225. Id. at 11-12 (encompassing Articles 3.2 and 3.3).
226. As of this writing, EarthLink and Google have entered into contract negotiations with San
Francisco. Press Release, City of S.F., San Francisco Concludes Evaluation of Proposals to Create
Universal, Affordable Wireless Broadband Network (Apr. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.sfgov.org/site/tech-connectpage.asp?id=38562.
227. S.F., CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 67.1(a) (2006).
228. Andrew Orlowski, San Francisco Shows World How Not to Do Muni Wi-Fi, THE
REGISTER, Dec. 23, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/23/sfmuniwifi/print.html.
229. Id. "[P]ublic versions" of the responses to the RFP are now available. See San Francisco
TechConnect, RFP Responses, http://www.sfgov.org/site/techconnect index.asp?id=36612 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2006) (providing public version of six responses to the RFP). While some are
lengthy, how these responses differ from those privately submitted to TechConnect is, of course,
impossible to determine, because there is no way for the public to examine those documents.
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The problems with this condition are significant and varied. Can and
will the public's communications be monitored? Can people rely upon the
system to communicate time or substantively sensitive information? Will
the system truly serve the disadvantaged; i.e., those who would not
otherwise have Internet access? 230 These and many other questions might
be unanswerable, or if answered, impossible to verify, given the broad
protections of trade secrecy law.
Moreover, as in Cisco's situation, efforts to improve upon these
networks, based upon the proposed plans, fall entirely to the provider.
Absent such broad protections, others might be able to independently fix
problems and, create improvements, without having to resort first to
fighting for access to information. In sum, while these cities should be
commended for identifying the possibility that they may need access to
information otherwise protected by trade secrecy, the fact remains that
they cannot unilaterally change a state law that is designed not for the
protection of the public's interest in access to information, but to ensure
the business's interest in keeping information secret.
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
As has been shown, it is in the area of public infrastructure that trade
secrecy problems become especially pernicious. Precisely because public
infrastructure relies heavily on human activity, and man-made principles
of behavior and conduct for its governing norms, rules, and laws, we have
a greater chance of affecting real and needed change. These rules are not
immutable. Our expectations of these entities change over time; we are not
bound primarily by what is beyond our reach or grasp, as we are with nonman-made resources. Indeed, our expectations of transparency and
accountability can only apply directly to those infrastructure goods and
services provided for public consumption by humans.
Thus, in the final part of this Article, I briefly consider how we can
assure public access to public infrastructure information, beyond access for
the government only.23' The first focus is on patent law. The basic solution
230. In an April 2006 letter, the ACLU of Northern California, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center noted several privacy concerns
associated with the operation of municipal WiFi by private entities. Letter from ACLU of N. Cal.,
Elec. Frontier Found., & Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., to Chris A. Vein, Acting Executive Dir., S.F.
Dep't of Telecomm. & Info. Servs. (Apr. 19, 2006), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/
uploadedfiles/dtis/tech-connect/googleltr4l9O6.pdf. The writers urged Vein to negotiate
"reasonable privacy rights for users of this network," including assuring that personal information
is not shared absent the voluntary consent of the owners and is protected. See id.
231. Because I am more concerned about unfettered public access to this information, rather
than mere access for governmental agencies or third-party ombudsmen, solutions such as the
establishment of a rule requiring that such information be placed in escrow with a government
agency are inadequate. Indeed, as discussed previously, once we enter into an escrow system, we
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is to abandon trade secrecy altogether and simply require commercial
public infrastructure providers to find their protection in patent.232
At least from a theoretical standpoint, the idea of patents as the primary
substitute for trade secrecy has appeal. Patent law is an arguably more
democratic notion than trade secrecy in the context of private provision of
public infrastructure, because of its public disclosure requirements and
limited duration of monopoly. A patent application, which becomes public
eighteen months after filing, must "describe, enable, and set forth the best
mode of carrying out the invention, '233 thus affecting substantial public
disclosure to anyone who wishes to understand the operations of the
invention.234 Patent law would also allow a company to capture the full
put power in the hands of entities that might have interests aligned with business. See supra note
211 and accompanying text. Even if not aligned to that extreme, such entities would be governed
by many interests, including political ones, in deciding who could see what information, and for
how long. While such a system might protect trade secrecy concerns for businesses, it runs the risk
of merely moving the locus of the problem from private industry to third-party entities keeping
business secrets. Of course, it would be helpful if government agencies, when faced with assertions
of trade secrecy that aim to limit public dissemination of information, scrutinize and challenge such
assertions to assure that they are meritorious. While perhaps an especially time- and resourceintensive undertaking for governmental agencies, such an undertaking would help rein in the
improper assertion of trade secrecy over what might otherwise be publicly accessible information.
232. Copyright could also be considered, but patent is the best and most complete substitute.
233. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,736 (2002) (citing
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
234. One major argument against eliminating trade secrecy protection is that it would
discourage private entities from entering the market. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
While this critique might have some validity, it is not necessarily true that a company would not
engage in public infrastructure projects; rather, they may simply charge more for the good or
service, the government may have to buy all rights to the goods and services from the provider, or
both. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency,91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 919 (2006) (noting
that "efforts to extend the burdens of public law procedural and disclosure requirements to private
entities inevitably reduce the economic and administrative advantages that originally led
government agencies to privatize or contract out previously public services"). The notion that the
existence of trade secrecy may encourage more competitive bids, which might lead to cheaper,
better services, highlights the basic concern that transparency may require some economic
sacrifices. To address such concerns, Professor Frischmann notes that absent market-based
incentives, private infrastructure providers could be rewarded by the following: (a) direct
government subsidization, (b) tax incentives, (c) cooperative research plans, and (d) encouraging
joint ventures. Frischmann, supra note 18, at 136. While beyond the scope of this Article, an
examination of these solutions, combined with an analysis of (a) the relevant markets for a given
good or service, like the limited market for a voting machine versus the larger market for Wi-Fi
technology, and (b) the potential ability of a technology to be utilized in contexts that are both
commercial and public, would be helpful to address the potential economic impact of eliminating
trade secrecy in favor of patent protection. Additionally, one may be concerned that under such a
system, the public would receive a "second best" version of the product or service; the private
sector getting the best product with the newest technology because trade secrecy is in place. While
a reasonable concern, even if it happened, market forces would likely prevent such an occurrence
for a long period of time. Presumably, if the acquired product was substandard, there would be
interest in finding a better version. Thus, should a substandard product be acquired, a business's
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economic value of the company's patented efforts for a significant time,
thereby preventing any argument of a takings problem.235
In contrast, while it allows reverse engineering and independent
discovery (often a time intensive or impossible endeavor, or both), trade
secrecy by its very definition abhors both transparency and public
accountability. Therefore, abandoning trade secrecy for private entities
engaged in public infrastructure and limiting protection to that which is
patentable is likely the right, if not perfect, answer.236 Whether this would
take the practical form of an additional "public infrastructure" element in
the definition of a trade secret or an affirmative defense to an action
alleging misappropriation is less significant than the notion that there is a
theoretical disconnect and that patent law may be a ready-made salve to
much of the sting of the loss of trade secrecy for public infrastructure
projects. Indeed, even where there is a limited market for the specialized
device, like Diebold's voting machines, patentability would still allow the
inventor to sell the product to its customers and license the product to its
competitors. Whether this is the most efficient way to provide public
infrastructure is, for purposes of this Article, secondary to the fact that
interest in serving that market might encourage a rival to compete and provide a better product.
235. A concern might be raised that by eliminating trade secrecy protection for private entities
engaged in public infrastructure altogether, the effect constitutes a taking by the government under
the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court has recognized that extinguishing a property interest,
including a trade secret, may constitute a taking. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1003 (1984). Generally, subject to certain conditions, so long as there is a "regulatory scheme with
both burdens and benefits," a give-and-take exchange will not be considered a taking. Phillip
Morris Inc. v. Reilly, 113 F. Supp. 2d 129, 144 (D. Mass. 2000). The argument against a takings
claim is that the voluntary submission of non-patentable trade secret information in return for the
pecuniary advantages of providing public infrastructure without government competition-a giveand-take-is not a taking. See Megan E. Gorman, Note, Going Up In Smoke: The Effect of Phillip
Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger & Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly on the Takings oflntellectualProperty,
33 RUTGERS L.J. 771,796-98 (2002) (approving, in the context of the Massachusetts government's
requirement that tobacco companies reveal the ingredients of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis of a takings challenge that "the voluntary submission in
exchange for advantages of a registration [to do business in Massachusetts] could 'hardly be called
a taking' (quoting Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 2001 WL 1215365, at *10 (1st Cir. Oct. 16,
2001))). Moreover, the continued existence ofpatent protection would militate against the argument
that public infrastructure providers have lost all protection of their trade secrecy rights.
236. It is important to recognize that businesses face real alternatives to secrecy. See HENRY
CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION 170-74 (2003) (discussing Intel's practice of publishing, rather
than patenting, those inventions that they would "prefer to put into the public domain," in an effort
to benefit their business); Jim Chen, Biodiversity and Biotechnology: A MisunderstoodRelation,
2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 79-81 (2005) (discussing the public benefits of patent law over trade
secrets and noting that trade secret law "by design, keeps information concealed [and] [b]y contrast,
patent [law is] designed to deliver privately held information into public hands"). But see Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155,
1161-63 (2002) (noting that § 112 of the Patent Act imposes minimal disclosure requirements for
software).
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transparency and accountability are increased under such a system."'
By this solution I am not suggesting that patents are purely democratic,
that all patent applications are thorough and complete, or that patent
constitutes the perfect substitute.238 Clearly, there are certain ideas and
processes that are better suited to trade secrecy protection. 23 9 However, the
fact remains that trade secrecy law serves interests that are anathema to
basic public values, and the sacrifice to greater public accountability must,
by definition, diminish some of these tangential advantages.24°
This somewhat drastic measure is made more appealing because courts
have had a difficult time determining what a "public concern" is for
purposes of First Amendment protection of disclosure of trade secrets by
the press. Professor Volokh has persuasively argued that courts have
consistently run into problems when considering situations where the news
media is sued for publishing a trade secret leaked to it by someone in
violation of their duty of confidentiality, but without encouragement from
the news media. 24 ' Therefore, a possible solution of relying on the courts
to simply allow dissemination of trade secrets deemed a "public concern"
would likely continue to run into the same subjective judicial problems
regarding where the line between a "public concern" justifying disclosure
and a "private concern" prohibiting disclosure should be drawn.242
237. Alternative solutions may be to retain trade secrecy in the research and development stage
only, where it has enormous potential value to a commercial entity, or to limit the amount of time
that trade secrecy protection may be applied to public infrastructure trade secrets. Such solutions
would address some of the problems that industry would face if trade secrecy were eliminated in
its entirety for public infrastructure projects.
238. Patent law has been subject to much criticism in recent years, for reasons ranging from
the overuse of patents in the computer software context to the amount of information that is actually
revealed in a patent application, and is therefore not the perfect solution. I acknowledge that there
may be items that can only be protected by trade secrecy, and that patent and trade secrecy are not
perfect substitutes. But, I submit, the majority of information about which the public would be
concerned could be subject to patent.
239. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
240. It should be noted that one criticism of this solution is that particular technologies used
in public infrastructure, like code in Cisco's routers, might also be used in normal private
commercial markets. In that case, a provider would face a choice: forgo trade secrecy, patent the
invention, and sell it to the public and governments; or keep the trade secrets (thereby challenging
competitors) and forgo the public infrastructure market. While a supplier may choose the latter
option in some cases, it is reasonable to assume that other entities will fill the void. In any case,
transparency would be achieved. While beyond the scope of this Article, an examination of the
substitutability of trade secrecy and accountability in this limited scenario, and more generally in
the research and development stage, should be considered.
241. Volokh, supranote 60, at 739-42; see alsoAlex Eaton-Salners, Note, DVD Copy Control
Association v. Bunner: Freedom ofSpeech and TradeSecrets, 19 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 269,282-83
(2004) (criticizing the decision of the California Supreme Court because its "formulation and
application of the public concern doctrine was incorrect").
242. Of course, by way of analogy, the United States Supreme Court has struggled with the
definition of a matter of "public concern" in First Amendment jurisprudence. See Dun &
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Additionally, it is worth noting that trade secrecy doctrine is not needed
as a vehicle to protect sensitive or potentially dangerous information from
falling into the hands of people or entities who may seek to do harm to the
United States' public infrastructure. For example, the Critical
Infrastructure Information Act (CIIA),243 passed as part of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002,24 regulates "the use and disclosure of information
submitted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [by businesses]
about vulnerabilities and threats to critical infrastructure. 245 While the
CIIA has been criticized for being superfluous 24 and having an overly
broad definition of "critical infrastructure information" that will allow an
enormous amount of information to be protected from disclosure to the
public, 247 the existence of the CI1A shows that trade secrecy doctrine is not
needed to protect sensitive information regarding our public infrastructure
from being accessed by those who could use that information to do
harm.248
Short of abandoning trade secrecy altogether, there are other potential
partial solutions. As discussed earlier, the commercial definition of a trade
secret could be narrowed, as in the FOIA trade secret exemption, 249 to only

apply to information that is actually used in commerce or where its
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 751-52, 758-59 (1985) (applying the
"public concern" test to a private plaintiff who alleged defamation based upon the defendant
sending an errant credit report to five subscribers and noting that "speech on public issues" is of
primary concern to the First Amendment). For example, it seems reasonable to assume that the
operation of a voting machine and its impact on one's ability to cast a recorded vote would have
to qualify as a "public concern" under First Amendment analysis.
243. 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 131-134 (West 2006).
244. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
245. GINA MARIE STEVENS, HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
INFORMATION ACT, Summary (2003).

246. See Brett Stohs, Protecting the Homelandby Exemption: Why the CriticalInfrastructure
InformationAct of 2002 Will Degrade the Freedom of InformationAct, 2002 DuKE L. & TECH.
REV. 18, 20 ("[T]he private sector exemptions are redundant and unnecessary. [FOIA] contains
several exemptions that protect information given to the government by private entities.").
247. See id. at 23 (quoting Representative Jan Schakowsky as saying that this definition is a
"loophole big enough to drive any corporation and its secrets through"); Editorial, Overkill in the
Name of Security, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 14, 2002, at 2D, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2002/07/14/newspf/Perspective/Overkill-in-the-name.shtml (criticizing
the legislation as providing an incentive for companies "to share all sorts of irrelevant information
with the government" because it would then be protected from public disclosure); Beryl A. Howell,
Op-Ed., Information Overload, LEGAL TIMES, June 2, 2003, at 52 (suggesting that DHS will
become a "dumping ground for large amounts of irrelevant and improperly marked business
information").
248. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze whether the CIIA is a proper method to
protect trade secret information. Nonetheless, the existence of this law suggests that one could craft
an exemption under FOIA that protects certain public infrastructure trade secrets from disclosure,
and thereby dispense with using the commercial definition for such purposes.
249. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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disclosure would pose an immediate threat to the security of the
infrastructure itself. In this way, the information that would be protected
from disclosure would be less than that covered by the current allencompassing definition, and would reflect more respect for the legitimate
needs of the public.
Alternatively, the duration of trade secret protection could be limited.
For example, a public infrastructure trade secret could be protected for up
to five years, at which time the holder of the secret would be required to
submit the trade secret to a government agency to hold in escrow. Either
or both of these solutions in tandem would address the most pernicious
aspects of trade secret protection of public infrastructure-namely, the
overly broad definition and potentially unlimited duration of a trade
secret-without wholesale abandonment of the doctrine."'
A final partial solution is to change the remedies allowed under a trade
secret claim by denying injunctive relief for the misappropriation or
innocent release of public infrastructure trade secrets and limiting relief to
monetary damages. This change would be nearly as drastic as denying
trade secret protection altogether, as injunctive relief is the most sought
after, and most important, remedy in trade secret misappropriation cases.
The typical trade secret injunction, which prevents the further
dissemination or use of the subject trade secret, attempts to put the "genie
back in the bottle." '' The effect is to put a lid on further examination of
the trade secret-again, against a core value of public governance. While
this does not prevent the public harm of keeping such knowledge secret
from a deserving public, it would at least prevent the quashing of public
examination once begun. Therefore, consideration of limiting relief to
monetary damages when public infrastructure trade secrets are
misappropriated should be explored. Such damages would be paid by the
misappropriating competitor, and could include the complete disgorgement
of profits earned by the misappropriating entity, but the public benefit of
disclosure would remain. The public knowledge gained, and, by dint of the
public disclosure of the secret, the possible improvements thereon, would
not be denied.
To be sure, none of the proposed solutions, save abandoning trade
secrecy altogether in the context of public infrastructure projects, are fully
satisfactory, as they do not fully harmonize the differing theoretical
underpinnings between these competing doctrines. The proper goal is to
have public transparency without coercion, absent the
250. Of course, any alteration of the contours of trade secret protection would have to pass
constitutional muster by not "frustrat[ing] the achievement of the congressional objectives served
by the patent law." Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154-56 (1989)
(reaffirming Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484, 489-90 (1974), and its analysis
of why the subject trade secret law did not conflict with Congress's patent objectives and goals).
251. See supranotes 194-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Cisco settlement).
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regulatory/administrative process or resort to the courts. None of these
options, save complete elimination of the law in the area of public
infrastructure, reset the system to a default of transparency; rather, they
force some modicum of disclosure where it would not normally exist. The
goal is transparency by default, and the absence of complete solutions
short of entirely eliminating trade secrecy in this area is perhaps the best
argument for why trade secrecy is simply an irreconcilable theoretical
mismatch with the values and goals inherent in the provision of public
infrastructure.
VII. CONCLUSION

The United States faces an increasing dilemma as it outsources and
privatizes infrastructural projects that were once primarily in the purview
of government, such as the operation of roads, and witnesses the wholesale
development of new forms of public infrastructure that require relatively
little from government, such as the Internet. Absent a commitment to
public values, private providers of public infrastructure risk alienating the
public-their consumers. While abandoning trade secrecy would have
some downsides, like forcing businesses to find other avenues of
protection for their business interests, absent change we face the real
likelihood of finding more and more information regarding our public
infrastructure hidden from public view and inspection. The values of
commerce will eliminate public values like transparency and
accountability from our voting machines, Internet routers, and
telecommunications systems.
To address these concerns, trade secrecy must be severely curtailed, if
not entirely eliminated, from the world of public infrastructure. Unless we
reconsider how trade secrecy is impacting our access to knowledge,
increasing amounts of information regarding our public infrastructure will
be hidden from public view, the commercial concerns of trade secrecy as
applied to otherwise publicly-oriented activities will continue to eclipse
the values of transparency and accountability, and a greater number of
people will pose Cato's ultimate question to Cisco, Diebold, and all other
public infrastructure providers: Are you seeking to instruct or deceive? For
everyone's benefit, and despite the potential economic downside,
abandoning trade secrecy in this context is the best way to answer that
question.
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